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THE CORPORATE PERSONHOOD  
TWO-STEP 
Carliss N. Chatman* 
The corporation cannot exist without its founders complying explicitly with 
the requirements for incorporation provided by state statutes. The artificial entity 
theory acknowledges that the corporation cannot and will not exist until its 
founders comply explicitly with the requirements for corporate formation and in-
corporation imposed by the state. A corporation is also, by design, a new and dis-
tinct entity divorced from its people. The real entity theory acknowledges that 
once a corporation is formed, it has rights that belong only to the corporation it-
self, wholly separate from its founders. By merging the artificial entity and real 
entity theories, the Court may properly define corporate rights. 
Because of the dual nature of the corporation, corporate personhood should 
be a question of fact, not a matter of law. Corporate personhood requires weigh-
ing the evidence and making a case-by-case determination based on the choices 
made at formation and how the corporation operates. To determine a corpora-
tion’s rights the Court should engage in a two-step analysis that gives deference 
to this duality. The Court should first rely on how the corporation is defined by 
statute to determine whether it is required to acknowledge the existence of the 
right for the corporation itself, then decide whether state action infringes on that 
right if it exists. Problems arise in corporate personhood jurisprudence when the 
courts give rights to corporations that states, legislatures, and founders did not 
intend. 
When granting corporations constitutional rights based on the rights of 
founders and shareholders in the aggregate, the Court is ignoring the parameters 
of the state law definition of the corporation, as well as the affirmative choices of 
corporate founders who deliberately chose the corporation over other forms of 
business. Citizens United and Hobby Lobby are recent examples of this disre-
gard of corporate statutes for the sake of protecting the rights of the people who 
make up the corporation.1 Engaging in a two-step analysis shows that it is impos-
sible for a corporation to be an association of citizens, which is contrary to the 
commentary in those court decisions. 
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1  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (Hobby Lobby), 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014); 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporations are defined by state law, and have rights incidental to that sta-
tus. Corporations also have rights defined by statutes. Because corporations are 
not naturally occurring, corporate constitutional rights should be analyzed with-
in the parameters of how the corporation is defined and how the corporation 
operates. When courts issue decisions that define corporate rights without first 
defining the corporate person, they may unintentionally alter what it means to 
be a corporation.2 When the Supreme Court gives consideration to the rights of 
the people who make up the corporation, it lays the framework for a corporate 
personhood doctrine that relies on the sanctity of constitutional rights for hu-
                                                        
2  See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (Free exercise includes protection of the religious 
liberties of the humans who own and control those companies). Once the corporation is de-
fined as equal to natural persons for one constitutional right, and once the Court discourages 
drawing distinctions between who is exercising the right as is suggested in Citizens United, 
the Court may be required to extend the analysis to other constitutional rights. See Carliss N. 
Chatman, Judgment Without Notice: The Unconstitutionality of Constructive Notice Follow-
ing Citizens United, 105 KY. L.J. 49, 76–78 (2016) (analyzing the danger of applying Citi-
zens United to Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 253 (2014). 
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man beings.3 This is both a conflation of the various business entities as well as 
a false equivalency between corporations and natural persons, which is outside 
of the scope of how the state defines the corporation. As a result, corporate per-
sonhood and constitutional rights derived solely from the rights of the people 
who make up the corporation are outside of the scope of what the corporate 
founders intended when choosing the corporate form. 
Citizens United and Hobby Lobby are recent examples of how this dismis-
sal of corporate statutes for the sake of protecting the rights of the people who 
make up the corporation creates a precedent that can have dangerous and unin-
tended consequences.4 Courts have accepted the rights of corporations as a 
foregone conclusion based in part on a flawed understanding of corporate for-
mation and governance.5 The courts have ignored the parameters for corporate 
existence laid out by the individual states, the choices made by corporate 
founders at formation, and the ways in which corporate operations differ from 
other forms of business, treating the corporation as legal equals to human be-
ings in a variety of contexts without a satisfactory justification in the law.6 This 
article will argue that to properly determine corporate rights, courts must en-
gage in a two-step analysis. In step one, they must properly define the corpora-
tion by reviewing how the corporation is defined by statute and how the corpo-
ration operates. This helps to determine whether the state is required to 
acknowledge the existence of the right for the corporation itself. Then, in step 
two they must decide whether an action infringes on that right. 
                                                        
3  See Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and 
Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 505–06 (2011) 
(The law “deals with corporations in a cumbersome and often inconsistent way.”). 
4  See, e.g., Stefan J. Padfield, A New Social Contract: Corporate Personality Theory and the 
Death of the Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 363, 376–77 (2017) (“[T]his exercise 
matters . . . because decisions like Hobby Lobby and Citizens United . . . are essentially in-
creasing corporate subsidies by strengthening corporate rights against state regulation. A 
corporate personality theory analysis can explain how the Supreme Court is justifying these 
decisions, while at the same time exposing serious flaws in the analysis.”); see also Amicus 
Curiae Brief of Corp. & Criminal Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at 3–8, Hobby 
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (Nos. 13-354 & 13-356) (Treating corporations as persons to exercis-
ing religion under RFRA contradicts basic tenets of corporate law). 
5  See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Per-
spectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1503 (1989) (The Court’s analysis of corpo-
rate rights is a “situational practice.”); Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of 
Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 98 (2014) (“What theory explains why corporations 
have some constitutional rights and not others? The Supreme Court has not offered a general 
theory.”); Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639, 
642–43 (2016) [hereinafter Pollman, Constitutionalizing] (Recent decisions have created a 
“new reliance on state corporate law that gives governance rules a quasi-constitutional di-
mension that was not originally part of their DNA.”); Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right 
to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 27, 32 (2014) [hereinafter Pollman, Right to Privacy] (arguing 
that “the Court has not developed a coherent method or test for” determining which rights 
corporations hold). 
6  See sources cited supra note 5; see, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Pro-
duction Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 292 (1999). 
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Corporate personhood analysis cannot end at formation. To fully analyze 
corporate rights, courts must properly acknowledge what the corporation is af-
ter it is formed, and engage in a fact-based analysis of what the corporation is 
intended to be. The issue of corporate personhood cannot be resolved by simply 
declaring, “corporations are people” or “corporations can never be people” be-
cause both statements are true. The corporation is a legal person in various re-
spects, but it is not equal to a human being. Corporations are uniquely posi-
tioned socially and economically. A corporation is not a human, not a 
manifestation of a document, and not a state actor. A new theoretical frame-
work is required to give proper acknowledgment to the corporate form. Starting 
at step one provides that framework. When starting at step one, the courts will 
be required to acknowledge corporate duality as represented by the artificial 
entity and real entity theories. 
Throughout this Article, I will utilize the following hypothetical to illus-
trate the difference between the Court’s current approach to corporate rights 
and an appropriate two-step analysis: 
Imagine a family so committed to their faith that they apply its principles to eve-
ry aspect of their lives, including the family business. The family owns and op-
erates five boutique hotels through their company, Ruby Hospitality Partners 
(“Ruby Partners”). As Hindus, they are vegetarians and do not allow employees 
to consume any animal flesh on the premises. They also only serve vegetarian 
food in the hotel restaurants. Ruby Partners’ vegetarian policy and the reason 
behind it is displayed in the restaurants, on hotel receipts, and in promotional lit-
erature. After decades of successful business, the family is concerned with en-
suring that the business can survive after they are gone. The company gains the 
attention of a venture capitalist, who provides the funding to make the upgrades 
necessary to help Ruby Hospitality transition to a corporation and go public. 
They incorporate under the provisions of Delaware law, and choose to incorpo-
rate for all allowable business purposes. Although the new company, Ruby Hos-
pitality, Inc. (“Ruby, Inc.”), is publicly traded, the family members stay on as 
the initial board of directors and all initial officers adhere to the Hindu faith and 
intend to maintain the vegetarian policy. Shortly after Ruby, Inc. goes public, an 
employee files suit for discrimination, alleging a medical need to consume ani-
mal products. In defense, Ruby, Inc. claims that banning meat is a tenet of the 
corporation’s faith, and to allow meat on the premises would infringe on its ex-
ercise of religion. 
The holdings of Citizens United7 and Hobby Lobby8 would allow Ruby, 
Inc. to assert the religious rights of the people who make up Ruby, even to the 
point of discrimination against employees.9 To reach this conclusion, the Court 
                                                        
7  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 310 (2010). 
8  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768. 
9  In August 2016, a federal judge in Michigan applied the Hobby Lobby holding to conclude 
that the religious beliefs of a Detroit-based funeral home allowed the company to fire a 
transgender employee who wished to dress as a woman without consequence. As a result, the 
former employee, Aimee Stephens, was not allowed to join a discrimination lawsuit initiated 
by the EEOC. See E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 
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would view Ruby, Inc. as a person capable of religious exercise through the 
rights of the people who make up Ruby, Inc.10 As a result, Ruby, Inc., an entity 
chosen deliberately to be distinct and separate from its founders, is embodied 
with rights that only a human being can fully enjoy by virtue of being the crea-
tion of natural persons. 
The proper approach would first look to what Ruby, Inc. is intended to be 
and how the new corporate entity differs from Ruby Partners. By definition 
Ruby, Inc. is an artificial entity that does not exist until its founders meet all 
requirements for corporate formation imposed by the state. Ruby, Inc. is also a 
real, stand-alone entity that is not linked to the existence of its people. By start-
ing at step one and looking at how Ruby, Inc. is defined by the state, Ruby, Inc. 
does not have religious rights based on the people who make up Ruby, Inc. 
Those people have chosen to divorce themselves from the business in exchange 
for the many benefits of corporate existence. To allow Ruby, Inc. to have free-
dom to exercise religion, step one requires looking at whether Ruby, Inc. itself 
was created to engage in religion, has a right to engage in religion based on 
how it is defined by corporate statute, or if the practice of religion is incidental 
to its corporate existence. 
The courts may also look to whether Ruby, Inc.’s activities are representa-
tive of the practice of religion or if Ruby, Inc., through representative corporate 
activity, is holding itself out to be engaging in such practice. If, after this re-
view, the Court decides that the corporation is entitled to the constitutional 
right, it can then engage in step two—a traditional constitutional analysis of the 
                                                                                                                                 
837, 856–57 (E.D. Mich. 2016). This recent holding contradicts the majority’s belief that the 
holding in Hobby Lobby is narrowly tailored and will not result in a flood of for-profit organ-
izations seeking exemptions. Compare Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783–85, with Garrett, 
supra note 5, at 145 (stating that the majority opinion in Hobby Lobby overreaches and con-
flates the standing of for-profit organizations). 
10  Hobby Lobby is based on a combination of an interpretation of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA) and the artificial construct of the closely held corporation being dis-
tinct enough from a public corporation to command separate constitutional rights. See, e.g., 
Steven J. Willis, Corporations, Taxes, and Religion: The Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Con-
traception Cases, 65 S.C. L. REV. 1, 32 (2013). On May 4, 2017, President Donald Trump 
issued the Presidential Executive Order Promoting Free Speech and Religious Liberty, which 
seeks to protect “the freedom of Americans and their organizations to exercise religion and 
participate fully in civic life without undue interference by the Federal Government.” Sec-
tion 3 of the Order requires, “The Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Labor, and the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services shall consider issuing amended regulations, con-
sistent with applicable law, to address conscience-based objections to the preventive-care 
mandate promulgated under section 300gg-13(a)(4) of title 42, United States Code.” Exec. 
Order No. 13798, 82 Fed. Reg. 21675 (May 4, 2017). In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Co-
lo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017), the plaintiff pushes it a step further, basing 
corporate First Amendment rights on the religious beliefs of a single shareholder and em-
ployee. The business seeks to be exempted from a generally applicable state law based on 
the religious beliefs of a single person, and makes no argument about the beliefs of the cor-
poration itself. Brief for Petitioners at 1–4, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 137 S. Ct. 2290 (No. 
16-111). 
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state’s actions.11 Step one of the analysis shows that the corporation is multi-
faceted: it is both a creature of the state and a stand-alone real entity. 
Two-step analysis demonstrates that it is impossible to make sweeping dec-
larations about the nature of corporate constitutional rights. The Constitution is 
written for human beings, not entities. To give corporations rights, a fiction 
must be created to imprint human characteristics onto the corporation. We can 
say legally that the corporation is two things—an artificial entity and a real en-
tity—and those two things require courts to examine and weigh evidence case 
by case to decide rights. There are no inalienable corporate rights; therefore, a 
rights determination for one corporation is merely persuasive authority for a 
determination of rights for another.12 
In defining the corporate person, courts must recognize the role of the state 
in developing corporate laws and the choices of the corporation’s founders.13 
State law determines both the weight of the evidence contemplated in step one, 
and which factors courts should consider in step one, because the states have 
determined what documents and filings define the corporation. Forming a cor-
poration is a deliberate and purposeful exercise of the founders’ rights, and 
should operate as an acceptance of the terms presented by the state—including 
any implied limitations on the corporation’s exercise of purely human rights.14 
When forming a corporation, what the people choose and what the state pro-
vides is an entity that is wholly separate from their individual identity.15 When 
                                                        
11  A two-step analysis of the facts in the Hobby Lobby decision may reach the same conclu-
sion as the Court. To determine whether Hobby Lobby may engage in religious exercise, the 
Court would first look to the formation documents to determine whether Hobby Lobby was 
created for the purpose of engaging in religious exercise, then to representations of the cor-
poration itself. The Court would not look to the actions of Hobby Lobby’s founders. The 
problem with the Court’s approach is that, by allowing Hobby Lobby to obtain rights based 
on the people who make up Hobby Lobby, it disregards the intentions of legislatures, states, 
and the founders of the corporation. A two-step analysis would clearly deny exercise of reli-
gious rights held only by the shareholders in Masterpiece Cakeshop without any evidence of 
similar beliefs being held and exercised by the corporation itself. 
12  See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Corporate Personhood and the Rights of Corporate Speech, 30 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 866–67 (2007). Professor Winkler notes that “[C]orporate rights 
have never been equivalent to those of individuals.” He also states, “[c]orporate personhood 
has played a smaller role in crafting corporate constitutional rights than many believe.” In-
stead, Professor Winkler explains how shareholder, third party, and capital market interests 
are protected when the state infringes on corporate constitutional rights in a way that would 
be prohibited for individuals, such as restrictions on commercial speech and SEC prospectus 
disclosure requirements. Two-step analysis and the hybrid theory allows for corporations to 
have necessary constitutional protections while protecting the rights and financial interests of 
those who interact with the corporation. 
13  See Pollman, Constitutionalizing, supra note 5, at 644 (discussing corporate law as state 
business law). 
14  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (2017). 
15  Founders not only have a choice in type of entity, but also in type of corporation. Found-
ers who desire a charitable or religious purpose may choose a non-profit 501(c)(3) corpora-
tion or a benefit corporation instead of the standard corporation for general business purpos-
es. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 391(j), 501 (2017) (requirements for an exempt 
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states recognize these entities, they must balance a desire to promote business 
with the interests of the state and rights of third parties who interact with the 
artificial business entities.16 In response to this unique and man-made situation, 
states weigh protection of unassociated individuals who interact with the corpo-
ration with the rights embodied in the corporation’s very existence.17 As illus-
trated by the transformation from Ruby Partners to Ruby, Inc., when analyzing 
the corporate person, courts often ignore the choices of the state and corporate 
founders, finding that the rights of the people who make up the corporation 
must be protected when the corporation acts. 
The corporation is not simply a conglomerate of individuals; therefore, the 
Court should carefully scrutinize organizational rights to avoid situations when 
corporate actions are taken at the expense of individual rights.18 Because many 
corporate rights decisions fail to give weight to actions of states and the goals 
of the founders, they often have unpredictable and unsettling results, giving the 
appearance of reasoning that is not based in corporate or constitutional law.19 
The Court has never explained the source of corporate constitutional rights or 
settled on a single theory of the nature of the corporate form.20 Instead, the 
Court ignores the deliberate choices of corporate founders, embodied in the dis-
tinctions between Ruby Partners and Ruby, Inc., allowing a corporation to avail 
itself of constitutional rights in situations when the Court feels a right is so fun-
damental that it may not be denied in any circumstance.21 This approach ig-
nores the fact that there are no individuals to protect after Ruby is incorporated. 
It also ignores that the individuals who incorporate Ruby retain their individual 
rights outside of the corporation. 
                                                                                                                                 
corporation, Delaware’s version of a nonprofit); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 361 (2017) (benefit 
corporations). 
16  Stefan J. Padfield, Finding State Action When Corporations Govern, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 
703, 724 (2009) (arguing corporate theory recognizes that “the State is one of the parties to 
the corporate contract with interests beyond merely providing gap-filler rules to effectuate as 
nearly as possible the intent of the corporate managers and shareholders.”). 
17  See, e.g., Thierry Kirat, The Firm Between Law and Economics, in THE FIRM AS AN 
ENTITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMICS, ACCOUNTING, AND THE LAW 131, 143 (Yuri Biondi 
et al. eds., 2007) (When discussing the unique positioning of the corporation, Kirat notes that 
the corporation “is not a stable condition of the price system but rather an actor and subject 
of the economic dynamic.”); David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Respon-
sibility, and the Limits of Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1324 (2007). 
18  See Chatman, supra note 2, at 88–90 (discussing the dangers of equalizing corporations to 
natural persons in contexts not contemplated by the Court). 
19  See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 257 ([T]here is no evidence that the First 
Amendment’s drafters contemplated spending money in election campaigns as a form of 
protected speech. Nor did they intend the First Amendment, or any of the Bill of Rights, to 
protect corporations.”); see also sources cited supra note 4. 
20  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 257. 
21  When analyzing the constitutional rights of human beings, there are certainly rights so 
fundamental that they may not be denied in any circumstance. It is my position that because 
corporations are creatures of the state given personhood status, limited circumstances or sce-
narios exist in which the state may deny rights to its creation. 
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This Article calls attention to how generations of the Court’s misunder-
standing about corporations have resulted in corporate rights decisions that are 
a hodgepodge of erroneous claims about the nature of corporations and how 
they function.22 Proceeding in four parts, it proposes a new paradigm for ana-
lyzing the corporation and its rights that reflects the realities of corporate for-
mation and existence. Part I provides a brief overview of the relevant theories 
of the corporation and the role of those theories in Supreme Court decisions. 
Part I also explains how theories of corporate personhood are referenced in the 
Citizens United decision. In Part II, this Article explores the role people play in 
corporations to illustrate the disconnect between the aggregate theory and the 
way a corporation operates. 
Part III expands the critique of the aggregate theory through a discussion of 
how Supreme Court decisions are flawed in their disregard of the realities of 
corporate governance realities. Part III also illustrates how the court historically 
starts at step two in its analysis of corporate rights—using the facts and possi-
ble outcomes to determine whether acknowledging corporate rights is required. 
Part IV explains two-step analysis based in the hybrid theory.23 The hybrid the-
ory allows the Court to acknowledge the nature of the corporation and corpo-
rate governance, granting rights that correspond with those granted by the state 
and the terms negotiated by the incorporators. It incorporates the dual nature of 
corporate existence into rights determinations. The Article concludes that the 
corporation is a hybrid: a combination of the artificial and real entity theories.24 
The corporation is a real, stand-alone entity, independent of the natural persons 
who form and operate it. But it is also an artificial entity with rights that are de-
fined and limited by the choices its creators made when adopting the state’s 
terms. 
I. PART ONE: AN OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE THEORIES 
Corporate personhood is not a new concept. As early as the 1800s, three 
distinct theories of the corporation could be found in American jurisprudence.25 
Chief Justice John Marshall acknowledged corporate personhood rights under 
the artificial entity/concession theory, aggregate theory, and real entity theory.26 
Even though corporate personhood is acknowledged so early in our nation’s 
history, allowing a corporation to access rights viewed as uniquely human 
                                                        
22  See infra Section III.B. 
23  The hybrid theory acknowledges that the corporation is both a creature of the state (artifi-
cial entity/concession theory) and a stand-alone independent entity (real entity theory). See 
infra Section IV.B. 
24  See infra Part III. 
25  See Bank of the U.S. v. Dandridge (Dandridge), 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 91–92 (1827) 
(real entity theory); Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward (Dartmouth), 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (artificial entity/concession theory); Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux 
(Deveaux), 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86–88, 91(1809) (aggregate theory). 
26  See discussion infra Section I.A. 
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shocks the sensibilities, as is shown by the public alarm following the Citizens 
United and Hobby Lobby decisions.27 The idea that an entity that does not live 
and breathe is entitled to the same rights as a human being is difficult for most 
to conceptualize even though it is the natural conclusion of decades of corpo-
rate personhood jurisprudence.28 This is particularly true when corporations en-
gage in activities associated only with living breathing persons, like being al-
lowed to influence elections or engaging in religious expression.29 
Much of the language on corporate personhood found in Court decisions 
fits within one or more of the major theories of corporate personhood first seen 
in American jurisprudence in Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinions: the artifi-
cial entity/concession theory, aggregate theory, or real entity theory.30 This is 
true even when the Court does not acknowledge a theory of the corpora-
tion.31The evolution of Chief Justice Marshall’s analysis demonstrates the fact 
intensive nature of determining corporate constitutional rights. The Court has 
altered how corporations are defined in order to give a corporation rights they 
the Court believes they deserve based on changing circumstance. But instead, 
the Court should clearly define the corporation, and then use the two-step anal-
ysis to grant corporate rights based on the circumstance. 
This Part first provides an overview of the theories of corporate person-
hood to lay the foundation for a discussion of how to adopt or reject them so 
they reflect the realities of the corporation’s legal existence. This Part then ex-
plains how the theories present themselves in Citizens United. 
A. Theories of Corporate Personhood 
There is no mention of the corporation in the Constitution, yet the Supreme 
Court has held on numerous occasions that the corporation may avail itself of 
constitutional rights.32 The concept is first expressed very early by the Supreme 
                                                        
27  See, e.g., Eric L. Lewis, Who Are ‘We the People’?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2014), https://ww 
w.nytimes.com/2014/10/05/opinion/sunday/who-are-we-the-people.html [https://perma.cc/Q 
X9A-GHYM]. 
28  See Chatman, supra note 2, at 76–78 (summarizing corporate personhood jurisprudence). 
29  For example, in his 2010 State of the Union Address, President Barack Obama objected 
not only to the campaign finance changes made by Citizens United, but also to the concept of 
corporate personhood generally. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 
27, 2010), in 156 CONG. REC. H418 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2010) (“Last week, the Supreme 
Court reversed a century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for special interests—
including foreign corporations—to spend without limit in our elections.”). 
30  There are other theories of the corporation, based in law, economics, and other fields of 
study. However, this article focuses only on these three theories. 
31  See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. 
REV. 999, 1016 (2010). 
32  See Susanna Kim Ripken, Citizens United, Corporate Personhood, and Corporate Pow-
er: The Tension Between Constitutional Law and Corporate Law, 6 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 285, 288 (2012) (“[O]ver the last 125 years, the Supreme Court has held corpo-
rations are persons entitled to numerous constitutional protections, even though the word 
‘corporation’ does not appear anywhere in the Constitution.”). 
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Court in a trilogy of decisions authored by Chief Justice John Marshall.33 In the 
three cases, Chief Justice Marshall justifies corporate personhood using three 
theories.34 In Marshall’s opinion, corporate personhood is either based on con-
cessions made by states and the corporation at the time of formation (artificial 
entity theory), the rights of persons who make up the corporation (aggregate 
theory), or the autonomy and independence of the corporation following for-
mation (real entity theory).35 The Court has either followed Marshall’s lead 
over the years, or has proclaimed the existence of corporate personhood with-
out any justification at all.36 In Citizens United, the Court chose the latter, al-
luding to three theories of corporate personhood, while proclaiming that it is 
not following any one theory.37 Below is a historical analysis of the three theo-
ries of corporate personhood discussed in this Article: the artificial entity theo-
ry, aggregate theory, and real entity theory. 
1. Artificial Entity Theory 
The Supreme Court first directly addressed the nature of the corporation in 
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.38 Expressing the artificial entity 
theory, Marshall states: 
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those 
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as 
incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to 
effect [sic] the object for which it was created.39 
Dartmouth shows that, at least initially, corporations were not persons and 
not entitled to all the rights of natural persons.40 This theory views corporate 
                                                        
33  Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (artificial 
entity/concession theory); Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86–88, 
91(1809); Bank of the U.S. v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 91–92 (1827) (real entity 
theory). 
34  See, e.g., Gwendolyn Gordon, Culture in Corporate Law or: A Black Corporation, a 
Christian Corporation, and a Maori Corporation Walk into a Bar. . ., 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
353, 368 (2016) (“Throughout the last century, courts have switched cheerfully back and 
forth, sometimes mid-opinion, in the idea of the corporation on which their analysis rests.”); 
Avi-Yonah, supra note 31(The court references all three theories). 
35  Dartmouth, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636 (artificial entity/concession theory); Deveaux, 9 
U.S. (5 Cranch) at 86–88, 91 (aggregate theory); Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 91–92 
(real entity theory). 
36  See infra Section II.B. 
37  See infra Section II.B. 
38  Dartmouth, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636. 
39  Id. 
40  See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. 
L.J. 1593 (1988); Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of 
Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1990); Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personification of 
the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987). See S. Ry. Co. 
v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 412–13 (1910); Morton J. Horowitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The 
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rights as merely the natural result of what is granted to the corporation during 
the chartering process.41 The corporation in Dartmouth is the subordinate of the 
government, which can grant the right to exist, take it away, alter it, and regu-
late it.42 Under the artificial entity theory, the corporation exists at the pleasure 
of the state, and the states have the authority to regulate corporations should 
they choose to do so.43 
While the artificial entity theory does not view corporations as distinctly 
separate persons and does not view rights as derivative of its natural persons’ 
rights, it does acknowledge the existence of corporate rights.44 Even in Dart-
mouth, the Court notes that corporations can own and sell property, or sue and 
be sued.45 Under the artificial entity theory, these rights are merely the result of 
what is granted during the chartering process; the corporation does not enter the 
state with rights, but the state cannot deny the rights that accompany state sanc-
tioned activities.46 Following Dartmouth, states pushed to the limits of the hold-
ing by adding corporate charter provisions permitting states to amend the terms 
of the bargain.47 Generally, when courts invoke the artificial entity theory, they 
                                                                                                                                 
Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 186 (1985) (when courts invoke 
concession theory, they are only concerned with protecting the rights granted by the state); 
see also Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporation as a “Real” Constitutional Person, 11 
U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 221, 225 (2011) (“[C]orporations are subordinate to the government, as 
government can create and regulate them.”). 
41  Dartmouth, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 667 (Story, J., concurring) (“Among other things, it [a 
corporation] possesses the capacity . . . of acting by the collected vote or will of its compo-
nent members, and of suing and being sued in all things touching its corporate rights and du-
ties.”); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906) (“[T]he corporation is a creature of the state 
. . . presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public”). See MARGARET M. BLAIR, 
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 207 (1995) (“[F]rom the beginning, . . . corporations [always] required [a] grant or 
charter from the state to exist.”); Avi-Yonah, supra note 31; Bratton supra note 5. 
42  See Terre Haute & I.R. Co. v. Indiana, 194 U.S. 579, 584 (1904); Hancock Mut. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Warren, 181 U.S. 73, 76 (1901) (“A corporation is the creature of the law, and none of 
its powers are original. They are precisely what the incorporating act has made them, and 
can only be exerted in the manner which that act authorizes.”). See Winkler, supra note 12, 
at 863 (“[E]arly decades of the U.S., the states exercised considerable control over corpora-
tions. . . .”). 
43  Dartmouth, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636; Avi-Yonah, supra note 31, at 1007; Bratton, supra 
note 5 (the concession/artificial entity theory comes in degrees: a strong version attributes 
the existence of the corporation to state sponsorship; the weaker version sets up state permis-
sion as a regulatory prerequisite to doing business). 
44  Dartmouth, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636 (artificial entity/concession theory); Bank of the 
U.S. v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 91–92 (1827) (real entity theory); Bank of the 
U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86–88, 91(1809) (aggregate theory). 
45  Dartmouth, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636; Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 91–92 (1827); 
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 91(1809). 
46  See Pollman, Constitutionalizing, supra note 5, at 647 (“Such restrictions were understood 
as permissible constraints within the sovereignty of the states, and not infringements of 
property or associational rights.”) (citing Head & Armory v. Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S. (2 
Cranch) 127, 167 (1804) (Marshall, J.)). 
47  See Winkler, supra note 12, at 864. 
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are only concerned with protecting the rights granted by the state.48 Thus, the 
artificial entity is a theory of acknowledgment, not expansion. 
2. Aggregate Theory 
Chief Justice Marshall’s view of the corporation also included the aggre-
gate theory, which views the corporation’s rights as indistinguishable from the 
rights of the people who make up and own the corporation—shareholders.49 
Chief Justice Marshall first proposed the aggregate theory in Bank of United 
States v. Deveaux, holding that a corporation cannot sue unless it is viewed as a 
company of individuals, represented by a corporate name.50 These individuals 
bring rights along with them that flow through them to the corporation.51 Those 
rights are not lost by virtue of uniting as a corporation.52 Notably, Deveaux is 
used by Chief Justice Marshall in a similar way that aggregate theory support-
ers use it today—to extend rights to corporations when by statute the state has 
indicated that it intends for only human beings to have access to what the stat-
ute provides.53 
Supporters of the aggregate theory believe that the corporation can do 
nothing unless human beings act on its behalf.54 The existence of the corpora-
tion is based in the reality of the existence of its humans.55 The aggregate theo-
ry was also initially a theory of limitations, binding corporations to only those 
things its people were capable of doing. Eventually, the theory evolved into a 
theory of expansion, invoking a grant of purely personal human rights to corpo-
rations.56 
                                                        
48  See Horowitz, supra note 40, at 186; David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 
DUKE L.J. 201, 212 (1990) (“[T]raditional 19th-century theory insisted that corporations 
lacked any powers beyond those conferred by the legislature.”). 
49  See, e.g., Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906); Dodge v. Woolsey, 
59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 364 (1855) (Corporation is an artificial entity that cannot sue or be 
sued in the courts unless the rights of the members of the corporation can be exercised under 
the corporate name) (Campbell, J., dissenting). See Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, 
The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 
1674 (2015) (courts have granted rights to corporations based on the corporation as an asso-
ciation of citizens since the 1800s). Blair and Pollman argue that the Court’s characterization 
as an association of citizens made sense through the nineteenth century, but no longer fit lat-
er corporations. Many scholars challenge whether shareholders have property rights in the 
corporation and function as its “owners.” See also discussion supra Section II.A. 
50  Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 86–88, 91. 
51  Id. 
52  See, e.g., supra note 8 and accompanying text; Garrett, supra note 5, at 98; see supra note 
49 and accompanying text. 
53  See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra Part III. 
54  See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 40, at 186. 
55  See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 
1, 9 (2015). 
56  See discussion infra Part II. 
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3. Real Entity Theory 
The third approach views the corporation as a stand-alone entity, separate 
and distinct from the state and its shareholders.57 Chief Justice Marshall also 
spoke to the real nature of the corporation, highlighting how the corporation 
can embody several theories in the mind of a person at once, depending on the 
context.58 He first formulated the real entity theory in the dissent of Bank of 
United States v. Dandridge.59 Marshall argued that the corporation is “one en-
tire impersonal entity, distinct from the individuals who compose it,” which 
will always distinguish its transactions from those of its members.60 Under this 
theory, corporations are real persons with real rights; all the state can do is rec-
ognize or refuse to recognize a corporation’s existence, but once existence is 
recognized the state cannot deny constitutional protections.61 A corporation is 
“neither the sum of its owners nor an extension of the state, but [is] a separate 
entity controlled by its managers.”62 Corporations hold property in their own 
names, enter into contracts that bind only the corporation in their own names, 
and engage in other activities indicative of stand-alone natural persons.63 Thus, 
under the real entity theory, after formation, the corporation is an entity unto 
itself, untethered from its founders, shareholders, and management. The people 
associated with the corporation are agents, investors, or lenders; they do not de-
fine the corporation. 
Corporate governance rules require that the best interest of the corporation, 
not the individual shareholders, be the priority of management.64 Under the real 
                                                        
57  See Johnson & Millon, supra note 55, at 8–9 (“[C]orporations own property, enter into 
contracts, and commit torts. They can sue and be sued in their own right. They are subject to 
penalties if they violate applicable criminal laws. They must comply with a vast array of fed-
eral and state regulations. . . . [T]hey are subject to income tax liability on the net income 
generated by their commercial activities. . . . [T]he rights and obligations of corporations are 
not simply those of their shareholders, officers, directors, employees, or other humans who 
participate in or are affected by the corporation’s activities.”); see also Olivier Weinstein, 
The Current State of the Economic Theory of the Firm: Contractual, Competence-based, and 
Beyond, in THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMICS, ACCOUNTING, AND THE 
LAW, supra note 17, at 33 (“The firm exists in its own right, as a specific entity, beyond the 
changing personalities of shareholders, workers and managers.”). 
58  Bank of the U.S. v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 91–92 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dis-
senting). 
59  Id. 
60  Id.; see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 31, at 1007. 
61  See Mayer, supra note 40, at 580–81. 
62  See Avi-Yonah, supra note 31, at 1001. 
63  See, e.g., Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The Value Systems Theory 
for Corporate Law, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 579, at 590–91 (2018) (“One of the hallmarks of the 
corporate form is that corporations are legal persons with rights, including the right to hold 
property in their own names. This means that, just as a natural person cannot be owned by 
another, a corporation cannot be owned by its shareholders. What shareholders do own are 
shares.”). 
64  Marc T. Moore & Antoine Rebérioux, The Corporate Governance of the Firm as an Enti-
ty: Old Issues for the New Debate, in THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
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entity theory, the courts recognize the true nature of corporate property and the 
relationship of the corporation with its shareholders and managers.65 Courts 
acknowledge that independence from individuals is required for limited liabil-
ity, perpetual life, and other elements essential to the corporate form.66 Under 
this theory, the corporation is a separate entity controlled by management that 
is embodied with its own rights and must comply with the law like any other 
person.67 
The theories of corporate personhood are useful for expressing the relation-
ship of the corporation to society in each context, but no single theory ade-
quately addresses every scenario. For this reason, Justices like Marshall alter-
nate between the theories of the corporation when analyzing rights, applying 
whichever theory supports the desired outcome.68 Over time the Court has 
switched among theories, sometimes within the same opinion, and eventually 
began expanding rights without relying on any theory of corporate person-
hood.69 The Court tends to rely on the aggregate and real entity theories when 
granting rights and the artificial entity theory when restricting corporate 
rights.70 Instead of being influenced by the realities of corporate structure and 
governance, the Court focuses on constitutional theory, taking a right-by-right, 
and in some circumstances, a case-by-case, approach.71 This approach is prob-
lematic when the Court disregards the intentions of corporate founders, states, 
and legislatures and grants rights to the corporation regardless. 
Many aspects of the corporation, including limited liability, may be negoti-
ated by contract.72 Thus, when founders choose the corporation, they are af-
firmatively choosing not to order their business dealings using private contract-
ing.73 When states define business entities, they do so with the intention of 
defining rules for formation and conditions for continued recognition.74 The 
                                                                                                                                 
ECONOMICS, ACCOUNTING, AND THE LAW, supra note 17, at 370 (“The corporate governance 
of the firm . . . must be based at root upon the managerialist conception of the interest of the 
company characteristic of most U.S. state corporate law systems. . . .”). 
65  See Weinstein, supra note 57. 
66  See Johnson & Millon, supra note 55, at 8. 
67  See also Weinstein, supra note 57 (“The firm exists in its own right, as a specific entity, 
beyond the changing personalities of shareholders, workers and managers”). 
68  See Avi-Yonah, supra note 31, at 1032 (“As the relationship of the corporation to the 
state, to society and to its members or shareholders changes, all three views of the corpora-
tion emerge, submerge and then re-emerge in slightly different but fundamentally similar 
forms.”). 
69  See Gordon, supra note 34, at 368 (“Throughout the last century, courts have switched 
cheerfully back and forth, sometimes mid-opinion, in the idea of the corporation on which 
their analysis rests.”). 
70  See Chatman, supra note 2. 
71  See Garrett, supra note 5, at 100. 
72  See HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 
22 (1995). 
73  See Millon, supra note 17, at 1307. 
74  See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 72, at 22. 
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current approach infringes upon the rights of the states to define business enti-
ties, and the freedom of individuals to contract for the entity with the parame-
ters they desire. Alternatively, the Court should examine the theories and adopt 
a position representative of the true corporate nature.75 The hybrid theory com-
bines the artificial entity and real entity theories to provide a legal approach to 
corporate rights that accurately reflects the true nature of corporations.76 Com-
bining the hybrid theory with the two-step analysis properly acknowledges the 
corporate form and results in the appropriate level of constitutional protection. 
B. The Corporate Form in Citizens United 
Early on, the Court ignored the use of the word “persons” in the Constitu-
tion, declaring without justification that the word included corporations.77 Al-
though corporations are not mentioned in the Constitution, as noted by both 
Justices Stevens and Scalia in the Citizens United opinion, the Court considered 
the nature of the corporation rather early.78 Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Citi-
zens United conveys a belief that the founding fathers’ silence on corporations 
within the text of the Constitution indicates an intention to include corporations 
in the rights given to persons.79 Justice Stevens’ dissent contradicts these state-
ments by profiling the history of corporations to show that the omission is in-
                                                        
75  See discussion infra Part IV. Many scholars credit this approach for the current discontent 
with Citizens United, and fault the approach for opening the door for an expansion of corpo-
rate rights beyond what the state and the Constitution’s drafters intended. See, e.g., Vincent 
S.J. Buccola, Corporate Rights and Organizational Neutrality, 101 IOWA L. REV. 499, 501 
(2016) (summarizing the corporate personhood debate reignited by Citizens United). 
76 See discussion infra Section IV.B. 
77  See generally Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886); see also David Ciepley, 
Neither Persons nor Associations: Against Constitutional Rights for Corporations, 1 J.L. & 
CTS. 222, 222 (2013) (drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to include cor-
porations as person granted due process); Winkler, supra note 12, at 865 (“When the court 
reporter included this statement at the beginning of the published opinion, corporate person-
hood was established—without argument, without justification, without explanation, and 
without dissent.”); Ripken, supra note 32, at 288. 
78  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 338–41, 371 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring); see 
also Mayer, supra note 40, at 579 n.8 (citing Gerard Carl Henderson, The Position of For-
eign Corporations in American Constitutional Law, in 2 HARVARD STUDIES IN 
JURISPRUDENCE 1 (1918)); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS 
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780–1970 (1970). 
79  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 338–41 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia’s concur-
rence states, “It never shows why ‘the freedom of speech’ that was the right of Englishmen 
did not include the freedom to speak in association with other individuals, including associa-
tion in the corporate form. . . . [T]he dissent feels no necessity to provide even an isolated 
statement from the founding era to the effect that corporations are not covered.” The Court 
disregarded the distinction between corporations, natural persons, and citizens; instead, the 
Citizens United majority proclaimed that states must look to the underlying nature of the 
right, not to the party exercising the right. Scalia also accepts as reality the interpretation of 
the corporation as an association of citizens without regard to corporate realities. See also 
Ciepley, supra note 77, at 222. 
18 NEV. L.J. 811, CHATMAN  - FINAL 5/15/18  12:28 PM 
826 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:811  
dicative of an original intent to deny corporations constitutional rights.80 Justice 
Stevens recounts all the ways a corporation is not a natural person: corporations 
enjoy limited shareholder liability, perpetual life; separation of ownership of 
property and its control; corporations also have no consciences, no beliefs, no 
feelings, no thoughts or desires.81 While the earliest cases agree with Stevens’ 
retelling of corporate nature, and there is no support for Scalia’s blanket asser-
tions about the original intent of the founders, the reality of the corporate form 
lies somewhere in between.82 
Because the language of the Constitution is focused on persons and citi-
zens, in order to extend rights to corporations the Court must define them as 
such through the legal fiction of corporate personhood.83 To make this logical 
leap the Court analogizes corporate scenarios to human scenarios, even when 
doing so contradicts the very nature of corporate law. At the oral re-argument 
for the Citizens United case, Justice Sotomayor questioned whether the leap 
was ever justified: 
[W]hat you are suggesting is that the courts who created corporations as persons, 
gave birth to corporations as persons, and there could be an argument made that 
that was the Court’s error to start with . . . the fact that the Court imbued a crea-
ture of State law with human characteristics.84 
Sotomayor’s questioning rightfully highlights the lack of support for cor-
porate rights in the Constitution.85 It falls in line with the artificial entity theory. 
                                                        
80  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens’s dissent 
states: “[T]here is not a scintilla of evidence to support the notion that anyone believed [it] 
would preclude regulatory distinctions based on the corporate form.” 
81  See id. at 371; see discussion infra Part III. 
82  See discussion supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
83  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 253 (“[T]he Court’s premise that corporations should 
have the same speech rights as individuals is just wrong. . . . There is no evidence that the 
framers of the First Amendment meant to protect corporations or campaign spending, let 
alone bestow a right for corporations to spend unlimited sums in election campaigns. The 
Supreme Court has explained that the First Amendment protects speech especially because 
of its importance to the autonomy and dignity of each person, something that has no meaning 
when it comes to corporations.”); see also Tucker, supra note 3, at 511. 
84  Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Citizens United, 588 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205). 
85  For a discussion of the lack of constitutional support for corporate rights, see, for exam-
ple, Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a Flawed 
Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 62 (2005) (“[T]he Court 
has never established a test to determine what a constitutional person is or whether a corpo-
ration meets such a test . . . The result is a foundational problem in corporate constitutional 
law, for the Court has granted corporations constitutional rights without engaging in the pre-
liminary inquiry of whether a corporation is entitled to them under the Constitution.”); 
Ciepley, supra note 77, at 224 (“[T]he question has never been decided but merely presumed 
decided. To this day, in place of argumentation, the Court either offers a flawed chain of 
precedent back to Santa Clara, which never addressed the question, or drops loose meta-
phors of corporations being ‘persons’ or ‘associations of persons,’ which conjure[s] up theo-
ries elaborated by others.”); Winkler, supra note 12, at 865. See also Tucker, supra note 3, at 
499 (discussing the five realities of corporate political speech ignored by the Court in Citi-
zens United). 
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Although correct, Justice Sotomayor’s questioning also highlights a common 
fallacy in corporate personhood analysis—the commitment to the corporation 
existing solely in one theory of corporate personhood.86 The “creature of State 
law with human characteristics” derives those characteristics in part from how 
it operates in the world after the state creates it—a principle of the real entity 
theory. Corporate personhood analysis cannot end at formation. To fully ana-
lyze corporate rights, the courts must properly acknowledge what the corpora-
tion is after it is formed. 
The majority in Citizens United holds that corporations have the same First 
Amendment rights as natural persons; therefore, restrictions on corporate 
spending in election campaigns are unconstitutional.87 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the majority explicitly stated that it did not adhere to any one theory of 
corporate personhood.88 This puts Citizens United on trend with other cases that 
personify the corporation without acknowledging a theory of corporate person-
hood.89 Professor Carl Mayer explains that for nearly sixty years the Court has 
avoided declaring explicitly that it subscribes to a particular corporate person-
hood theory.90 Instead, the Court looks at the right itself and the purpose of the 
right, essentially starting at step two and presuming that the organization is en-
titled to the right.91 This is precisely how the majority of Citizens United ar-
rived at its holding. 
As with most corporate personhood opinions, in Citizens United one can 
see theories of corporate personhood within the decision, even when the Court 
does not acknowledge them.92 In holding that a corporation is entitled to free-
                                                        
86  See Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 63, at 45 (noting that the flaw in the Court’s approach 
to corporate personhood is viewing the corporation through the lens of only its obligations to 
the shareholder, instead of viewing the corporation as a whole system of many component 
parts). 
87  Citizens United, 588 U.S. at 385. Professor Chemerinsky disagrees with the premise that 
spending money is speech. He believes spending money is conduct, and references Justice 
Steven’s explanation that money is a property right subject to lesser protections than speech. 
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 253. 
88  Citizens United, 588 U.S. at 310. 
89  Mayer, supra note 40, at 620 (“Before 1960, the Court only considered corporations’ con-
stitutional guarantees within the strictures of corporate personhood theory: a corporation was 
either an ‘artificial’ entity subject to expansive state regulation or a ‘natural’ entity entitled to 
constitutional protections against the state. After 1960, the Court abandoned theorizing about 
corporate personhood.”). 
90  Id. 
91  See discussion infra Part IV (outlining the differences between human beings and artifi-
cial persons, and fully explaining step one analysis); see also Transcript of Oral Argument, 
supra note 84; Ciepley, supra note 77, at 223 (explaining that the Court never offered a sus-
tainable argument as to why corporations have constitutional rights); Krannich, supra note 
85, at 62; Mayer, supra note 40, at 629 (“Frequently the Court looked to the history of the 
amendment in question to justify corporate rights [and] . . . occasionally the Court examined 
the underlying purposes of an amendment.”). 
92  Professor Padfield’s work has extensively profiled the impact of silent corporate person-
hood in Supreme Court decisions. See Stefan J. Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theo-
ry in the Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Cases, 15 J. CONST. L. 831, 834 (2013) [here-
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speech rights equal to those held by an individual because it is capable of 
speaking, the majority hinted at the aggregate and real entity theories.93 The 
Court equated corporations to natural persons, declaring that since the corpora-
tion is capable of speaking, either through money or through persons in the ag-
gregate, it is entitled to constitutional free-speech rights.94 Instead of taking 
constitutional silence as an indication of the non-existence of corporate rights, 
the Court decides that silence indicated intent to grant corporations rights based 
on the rights of its shareholders. 
In Citizens United, the majority struck down a campaign finance regulation 
on the premise that corporations should receive the same First Amendment pro-
tections as natural persons, holding that distinctions based on who is asserting a 
right are improper.95 In support of this holding, the Court cited First Amend-
ment cases and stated that it “rejected the argument that political speech of cor-
porations or other associations should be treated differently under the First 
Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’ ”96 This 
not only ignores the distinction between entities and persons, but also the statu-
tory differences between the various business entities. The Court held that 
Congress had “no basis . . . [to] impose restrictions on certain disfavored 
speakers.”97 The majority also held that there was no support for the view that 
the Amendment’s original meaning would permit suppressing a media corpora-
tion’s political speech.98 Citizens United expanded corporate rights, holding 
that the distinctions between corporate persons and citizens are not proper; in-
stead, corporations should not be restricted any more than a wealthy individu-
al.99 
                                                                                                                                 
inafter Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory] (examining the cases leading up to 
Citizens United, finding that a silent corporate theory debate is evident); Stefan J. Padfield, 
Citizens United and the Nexus-of-Contracts Presumption, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 25 
(2011), http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Padfield_Online_Article.pdf [https 
://perma.cc/G39D-KSF2] (arguing that in Citizens United, “adoption of . . . competing theo-
ries of the firm was in some meaningful way dispositive”). 
93  See supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text. 
94  Gordon, supra note 34, at 370 (“Citizens United . . . indicate[s] that corporations simply 
were speakers, indistinguishable from any other speakers, for the purposes of First Amend-
ment speech rights. . . . The bright-line approach favored by the current Court is a new de-
velopment.”). 
95  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349–57 (2010). 
96  Id. at 343, (citing First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)). 
97  Id. at 341. 
98  Id. at 353; Joan MacLeod Heminway, Thoughts on the Corporation as a Person for Pur-
poses of Corporate Criminal Liability, 41 STETSON L. REV. 137, 138 (2011) (“In Citizens 
United, the Court determined that political-speech protections under the First Amendment 
apply to corporations as well as individuals, and it found no basis to allow the government to 
impose political-speech limits ‘on certain disfavored speakers.’ ”). 
99  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 355–56. The court is also implying that distinctions between 
partnerships, limited liability companies (LLCs), and corporations are not appropriate for 
consideration when determining rights. 
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Justice Steven’s dissent in Citizens United invokes the artificial entity theo-
ry.100 He envisions corporations as state approved entities, which exist at the 
pleasure of the government, are non-corporeal, and may be subject to more ex-
tensive regulation than a natural person due to this privileged position.101 Scal-
ia’s concurrence criticizes Justice Steven’s dissent because “[i]t never shows 
why ‘the freedom of speech’ that was the right of Englishmen did not include 
the freedom to speak in association with other individuals, including associa-
tion in the corporate form.”102 According to Scalia and the majority, because 
the corporation is an association of individuals, the individuals do not lose their 
constitutional rights when they assemble.103 Denying a corporation the oppor-
tunity to voice its opinion on elections is the equivalent of denying the free 
speech rights of the citizens who make up a corporation.104 This standard does 
not change, even if the corporation itself is merely a person and not a citizen 
with the ability to actually vote in an election.105 
Justice Scalia’s position ignores the distinctions between business entities 
and the purpose of choosing to form a corporation. It also ignores the fact that 
the individuals who form the corporation can still voice their opinions individ-
ually. While a corporation may rightly be viewed as an association of individu-
als, it is an association of individuals who affirmatively choose the corporation. 
It is a business structure divorced from their person for purposes of profits, lia-
bility, and management instead of the partnership, which maintains the identity 
of the individuals and operates more like the pure association of citizens indi-
cated by the aggregate theory.106 By availing themselves of the benefits of the 
corporate choice, these individuals are affirmatively choosing to give up indi-
viduality to create a new and separate corporate person.107 
The majority’s position in Citizens United is not new, it is merely the first 
time the Court explicitly declared that corporate constitutional rights should be 
equal to individuals. This leap is aided by the Court’s express abandonment of 
a theory of corporate personhood. The Court, acting without a clear definition 
of the corporation and constitutional restrictions of its own choosing, could ex-
pand rights by merely choosing a new standard and accepting it as law.108 The 
Court’s failure to articulate a clear corporate personhood theory or a consistent 
means of analyzing corporate rights presents both a challenge and an oppor-
                                                        
100  Id. at 393 (Stevens J., dissenting). 
101  Id. at 385–86, 391–92 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
102  Id. at 386. 
103  See Avi-Yonah, supra note 31, at 1041; Ciepley, supra note 77, at 224. 
104  See Ciepley, supra note 77, at 234–35. 
105  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 424–31 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
106  BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 72, at 4 (“[N]o one is forced to use the corporate form of 
organization: there is freedom of choice in organizational form. . . . This fundamental choice 
constrains the ability of corporate managers to misbehave.”). 
107  See infra notes 112–19 and accompanying text. 
108  See, e.g., Robert Sprague & Mary Ellen Wells, The Supreme Court as Prometheus: 
Breathing Life into the Corporate Supercitizen, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 507, 550–51 (2012). 
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tunity for those who view Citizens United as an overreach. Cases like Citizens 
United accept corporate rights and personhood status as a foregone conclusion, 
making it difficult to determine at any given moment what rights a corporation 
has and what limitations are imposed on those rights.109 
In Citizens United, the Court also disregards the role of the people it seeks 
to protect in corporate governance: the shareholders. The aggregate theory, 
which views corporations as an association of citizens, does not reflect the real-
ity of corporate operations. Instead, courts should engage in a two-step analysis 
of representations of corporate personhood that both acknowledges the state’s 
definition of a corporation and how the corporation defines itself. The next Part 
provides an analysis of the role people play in the corporation. 
II. PART TWO: THE CORPORATION HAS NO PEOPLE 
Legally, shareholders act in a limited number of ways: through voting, res-
olution, exercise of inspection rights, litigation, or selling their shares.110 The 
shareholders are mere financial investors, and entrust all of the decisions to the 
board of directors and officers of the corporation.111 The shareholders purchase 
shares, receive equity, and give up control of the company in exchange for a 
complete shield from personal liability.112 The actions shareholders may take 
can be limited in corporate charters, bylaws, or other contractual agreements.113 
                                                        
109  See Ciepley, supra note 77, at 222–23 (Professor Ciepley believes the rights of a corpora-
tion are purely contractual, corporations have no constitutional rights); see also Amicus Cu-
riae Brief of Corp. & Criminal Law Professors in Support of Petitioners, supra note 4, at 3–4 
(discussing how application of RFRA to corporations frustrates corporate law). While I be-
lieve that corporations do have constitutional rights for reasons that are based in more than 
contract, I disagree with the Court’s use of a case that should be founded in corporate law, 
like Citizens United or Hobby Lobby, to make a general point about freedom of speech or 
freedom of religion. The Court’s analysis of those rights in both cases would be correct if it 
was applied to human beings. 
110  See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
204–06, 208 (2012); see also BLAIR, supra note 41, at 69 (“[T]he number of matters that 
must be submitted to shareholder vote is limited. . . . [T]hese include substantive amend-
ments to the articles of incorporation and fundamental changes that are not part of the ordi-
nary business of the company, such as merger, dissolution, or disposition of a substantial 
part of corporate assets.”). 
111  See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (business and affairs of 
the corporation managed under the direction of the board). Some argue that shareholders are 
not owners, but mere holders of equity in the corporation. Professors Blair and Stout’s theory 
of asset lock-in notes that the shareholder’s contribution cannot be unilaterally withdrawn 
from the corporation by shareholders, just as it cannot be withdrawn by the corporation’s 
creditors. The corporation’s assets belong to the corporation and not its investors, meaning 
even a shareholder’s equity rights are limited. Instead of having a right to dissolve a compa-
ny if necessary to retain the full value of the capital contribution, such as in a partnership, 
shareholders’ ability to withdraw assets from a corporation is limited by the market and di-
rector approval. See Blair & Stout, supra note 6, at 278. 
112  Shareholder contributions to the new stand-alone corporate entity creates a level of sta-
bility not found in other business entities. This stability in return limits the rights of share-
holders in many respects. When shareholders make their investment in a corporation, they 
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Although much of corporate governance has been based on the concept of 
shareholder primacy, many have noted that the interests of shareholders are not 
the driving force in corporate decisions.114 This Part first describes the true na-
ture of shareholder rights, then explains the role of corporate directors and of-
ficers. 
A. The True Nature of Shareholder Rights 
As early as 1963, Adolf Berle noted the shift from ownership control of 
corporations, more common in closely held corporations, to management con-
trol.115 As the purchase of stock became a secondary market, with major influ-
ence from institutional investors such as pension funds, mutual funds, and other 
financial institutions, the thoughts and desires of individual human investors 
had a reduced impact.116 Berle also noted that this management group is re-
sponsible to the company first, and the individual whims of shareholders se-
cond.117 The structure of corporations does not allow shareholders to be in-
                                                                                                                                 
may only get their money back if there is a buyer willing to pay a price equal to the full val-
ue of the shareholder’s investment, the corporation itself buys back the shares, or a court de-
termines the corporation must compensate the shareholder. See Lynn A. Stout, On the Na-
ture of Corporations, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 255 (2005). 
113  See LISA M. FAIRFAX, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A PRIMER ON SHAREHOLDER 
ACTIVISM 12 (2011) (“Although the shareholder voting right has been described as funda-
mental, it is relatively limited. . . . State corporate law provides that the board exercises most 
of the power and control within the corporation.”). 
114  See Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 63, at 14 (noting the criticism of shareholder prima-
cy). 
115  Adolf A. Berle Jr., The Impact of the Corporation on Classical Economic Theory, in THE 
FIRM AS AN ENTITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMICS, ACCOUNTING, AND THE LAW, supra note 
17, at 96 (stockholders derive what influence they have from socio-political, not from entre-
preneurial, factors). 
116  Id. at 94. Berle notes the sentimental rather than capital raising nature of the secondary 
stock market. The corporation does not need the stockholder’s money, as the stock on the 
exchange is being purchased from a current owner, not the corporation itself. As a result, 
“the classical justification for him as a source of capital, or as investment risk-taker, let alone 
as entrepreneur-manager, simply disappears.” Id. at 102; see BLAIR, supra note 41, at 68–69 
(shareholders may exit by selling shares, or communicate directly to management, but in 
practice gives shareholders little power); Stout, supra note 112 (Shareholders are investors 
with a right to sell shares, but no right to compel a cash out from the corporation. It is the 
secondary market that makes shares freely alienable; otherwise a purchase of shares locks in 
capital to the corporation like a “tar pit” that is easier to get into than to get out of. There is 
no recourse if shares are worth less than the shareholder put into the corporation). 
117  Berle, supra note 115 at 96. In the Amicus Brief of Corporate Law Professors in Support 
of Respondents in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 
2290 (2017), it is noted that the varying opinions among legal scholars on shareholder pri-
macy does not undermine a unanimous view on corporate separateness. “Shareholder prima-
cy is simply a description of one view of the fiduciary duties of management. It does not 
mean that shareholders and the corporation are identical as a matter of legal rights and obli-
gations.” Brief of Amici Curiae Corp. Law Professors in Support of Respondents, at 15 n.7, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 137 S. Ct. 2290 (No. 16-111). 
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volved in the day-to-day decision making of corporations, and even if it did, the 
shareholders are disincentivized to do so.118 
The requirement for a majority vote further limits the influence of an indi-
vidual shareholder.119 Shareholder votes are often counted in ways that allow 
for limits on minority influence, like super majority or non-cumulative vot-
ing.120 Anyone with the funds can become a shareholder, but it takes considera-
ble wealth or collective power for shareholders to have the power to make 
changes.121 Shareholders who own the majority of shares are typically com-
prised of an elite class of individuals—institutions such as mutual funds buying 
on behalf of investors collectively, the initial founders of the company, and 
other power investors.122 For this reason, shares are only controlled by “people” 
if all types of institutions—including hedge funds, banks, mutual funds—are 
equal to people.123 Thus, even if a corporation is viewed as a representative, ag-
gregate body, the entities they represent are not natural persons.124 Like nesting 
dolls, institutions that may not have rights unless the aggregate theory is uti-
lized, are being extended additional rights through their interests in a corpora-
tion.125 Any individual purchasing shares on the open market has little to no 
ability to impact corporate operations or to have their opinion represented, at 
least not at the level of an investment bank or wealthy investor. 
Corporations are not the only entity with limited liability, so when a corpo-
ration is formed, it is an affirmative decision to choose all the positives and 
negatives of the corporate form, including giving up control. LPs, LLPs, and 
LLCs126 can come close to simulating many of the benefits of corporations 
                                                        
118  Berle, supra note 115. 
119  Another restriction is the requirement for a unanimous vote for shareholder action with-
out a meeting. See FAIRFAX, supra note 113, at 19. 
120  Id. at 15–16. 
121  Id. 
122  See BLAIR, supra note 41, at 72–76 (discussing the rise of institutional investors, and the 
myth of corporate democracy as a result of shareholder activism); FAIRFAX, supra note 113, 
at 45–61; see also Berle, supra note 115 (noting rise of institutional investors). 
123  See BLAIR, supra note 41, at 147–48 (Financial institutions hold more than forty percent 
of the total financial claims against U.S. individuals, corporations and governments; more 
than eighty percent of corporate bonds, and almost half of corporate equity claims. Even so, 
institutions have their own agenda, which may not involve getting involved in management 
or closely monitoring). 
124  If the owners of shares are also artificial entity, acknowledging the rights of the people 
who make up the firm creates a scenario of nesting dolls in which courts are protecting the 
rights of the people who make up the company that makes up the company. See, e.g., Tuck-
er, supra note 3, at 528 (noting the agency problems with granting rights based on the people 
who make up the corporation). 
125  See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 110; BLAIR, supra note 41, at 147–48; FAIRFAX, supra note 
113, at 45–61. 
126  I do not discuss the LLC extensively because I believe it can, depending on the structure 
chosen by founders, operate like a partnership or a corporation. For this reason, I believe the 
LLC to best be described as a hybrid of the artificial entity theory and the nexus of contracts 
theory. The LLC does not exist without the state, but once formed whether it should be treat-
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while allowing owners to maintain a higher level of control, and continuing the 
operation of the company as an aggregate of the people who make up the com-
pany.127 Therefore, when corporate founders choose the corporation, they have 
the full menu of business entities at their disposal, and make the affirmative 
choice to incorporate.128 
Despite these statutory realities, the Court, in Citizens United and other de-
cisions, would have us believe that corporations represent the opinions of the 
founders and managers the same as partnerships or sole proprietorships.129 By 
statute and by contract, corporate structure differs from what the courts portray. 
The reality of the corporation is that management is divorced from ownership 
so it operates more like a monarchy (or oligarchy) than a democracy.130 The 
                                                                                                                                 
ed like an association of citizens or a real entity will be determined by contract. Nexus of 
contracts envisions the corporation as a legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a mass of bi-
lateral contracts, which various individuals have voluntarily entered into for their mutual 
benefit. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. 
REV. 1259, 1273 (1982). As Professor Joseph Morrissey explains, “[w]hile the state entity 
proponents argue that whatever the state creates it can regulate, the contractarians argue that 
the state’s role should be limited to enforcing and policing the privately structured contracts 
that create and sustain the corporation.” Joseph F. Morrissey, A Contractarian Critique of 
Citizens United, 15 J. CONST. L. 765, 812 (2013). Many scholars disagree with this theory, 
stating that viewing the corporation as a nexus of contract or as assets/property does not ade-
quately represent the true nature of the corporation. See, e.g., David Gindis, Some Building 
Blocks for a Theory of the Firm as a Real Entity, in THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR ECONOMICS, ACCOUNTING, AND THE LAW, supra note 17, at 277 (“Firms are not simply 
sets of contracts or collections of assets. . . . Firms are not aggregates or ‘mereologicial 
sums.’ The very issue of comparing the whole to the sum of its parts is problematic. . . . 
[T]he whole is reducible neither to its members (e.g. owners) nor its parts (e.g. assets)”); 
Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 63, at 10 (“[T]he nexus of contracts theory can be critiqued 
for failing to acknowledge the corporation’s legal personhood, and also failing to emphasize 
the crucial role played by the state in creating the corporation.”); Grant M. Hayden & Mat-
thew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of “Nexus of Contracts” Theory, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1130 (2011) (because individuals must apply to a state for permission 
to form a corporation, the corporation cannot be formed by contract). 
127  See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 72, at 4–5 (individuals choose among types of or-
ganizations by comparing costs and benefits of forms, including the costs and benefits of 
delegating control to agents). 
128  See, e.g., Agai v. Diontech Consulting, Inc., No. 102968/07, 2013 WL 4419323, at *1–2 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 19, 2013) (Factors to be considered by a court in determining whether to 
pierce the corporate veil include failure to adhere to corporate formalities, inadequate capi-
talization, commingling of assets, and use of corporate funds for personal use). 
129  Id.; See also Pollman, Constitutionalizing, supra note 5, at 665 (“The Court’s decisions 
expanding speech and religious liberty rights of business corporations rely, at least in part, 
on a view of corporations as associations and corporate law as establishing procedures of 
‘democracy’ for shareholders. But not all business corporations have an associational dy-
namic and existing corporate laws do not create democratic procedures, nor is that their 
aim.”). 
130  See BLAIR, supra note 41, at 69 (“In principle, the law is intended to give shareholders a 
significant amount of control. In practice, it does not always work out that way. Technically, 
shareholders must regularly elect or reelect the board of directors, but shareholders cannot 
easily remove a director whose term has not expired, and shareholders do not, typically, par-
ticipate in the nomination process for new directors.”); see Berle, supra note 115 (stockhold-
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aggregate theory presumes the corporation is an expression of the business de-
cisions of the people who make up the corporation in the same way that a part-
nership represents the business decisions of the partners.131 When adopting the 
principles of the aggregate theory, the Court assumes that shareholders have a 
voice that is expressed in corporate actions.132 The separation of management 
and ownership means that corporate governance is not about the voice of 
shareholders in the way that a partnership is the voice of the partners. Instead, 
directors and officers are the voices that speak for the corporation.133 
The statutory requirements and nature of corporate governance are not the 
only things that limit the volume of the shareholder’s voice.134 The traditional 
assumption is that shareholders are not incentivized economically to be active 
in corporate operations.135 The expense of investigation, advancing shareholder 
initiatives, and of shareholder derivative suits all create rational ignorance in 
the average shareholder.136 There is no benefit gained from spending money in 
order to get familiar enough with corporate operations to pursue measures that 
may be greater than the value of an individual’s financial investment.137 In-
stead, it is more rational for the average shareholder to be a passive investor 
and rely on the recommendations of the board.138 This is true even for many 
shareholders who control a majority of shares, as those investors often hold a 
                                                                                                                                 
ers derive what influence they have from socio-political, not from entrepreneurial, factors); 
see also, e.g., Statement on Company Law: Summary: Fundamental Rules of Corporate Law, 
THE MODERN CORP. (Sept. 14, 2014), https://themoderncorporation.wordpress.com/company 
-law-memo/ [https://perma.cc/LES9-ZM77] (“Certain beliefs about corporations and corpo-
rate law are widely held and relied upon by business experts, the financial press, and econo-
mists who study the firm. Unfortunately, some of these widely-held beliefs are mistaken.”). 
131  In a closely held corporation, the people who make up the corporation are responsible for 
corporate decisions, but not in their role as shareholder. For a discussion of closely held cor-
porations, see infra notes 205–11 and accompanying text. 
132  See, e.g., Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 63, at 13 (noting that the shareholder contract 
gives shareholders limited rights with almost no real influence in the context of a public cor-
poration with dispersed share ownership). 
133  See, e.g., Andrew A. Schwartz, Corporate Legacy, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 237, 245–49, 
254 (2015) (noting the rate at which IPOs include anti-takeover defenses, despite market 
forces that show including them. Schwartz theorizes that the desire for corporate legacy and 
perpetual life is a stronger force than shareholder desires and market forces). See also BLAIR, 
supra note 41, at 77 (governance and control of corporations occurs through customs, cultur-
al norms, and institutional arrangements); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as 
Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1, 25 (2002) (“Put simply, the board is the nexus.”); 
Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 63, at 41 (proposing that shareholder value is an illusory met-
ric for measuring director behavior, and that systems theory is an appropriate tool for as-
sessing performance). 
134  BLAIR, supra note 41, at 79; see Schwartz, supra note 133, at 254. 
135  See FAIRFAX, supra note 113, at 5; see also BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 72, at 7–8 
(shareholders are rationally ignorant, but protected by the right to vote and sell shares). 
136  BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 72, at 8. 
137  Id. 
138  Id. 
18 NEV. L.J. 811, CHATMAN  - FINAL 5/15/18  12:28 PM 
Spring 2018] COPORATE PERSONHOOD 835 
large number of shares in numerous corporations.139 For this reason, much 
shareholder activism begins at the initiative of disgruntled board members or is 
a result of merger and acquisition activity.140 
The Court’s perception of corporate ownership should be influenced by the 
realities of ownership and formation.141 Unfortunately, the Court bases its opin-
ion on erroneous assumptions when it rules that corporations have speech and 
religion rights based on the aggregate of the people who “make up the corpora-
tion.”142 Those who make up the corporation, under the Court’s definition, are 
not those whose rights are represented by corporate actions. Those who “make 
up” the corporation are mostly silent investors.143 The role of corporate share-
holders is especially insignificant when compared to the actions of the investors 
of a partnership, who may also be engaged in management of the partnership. 
By apprising themselves of limited liability, shareholders agree to trust others 
to represent their purely financial interests and serve the corporate purpose in-
dicated at the time of incorporation.144 
B. Directors and Officers: The Corporation’s People? 
Corporations act through shareholders as well as directors and officers au-
thorized by state law to carry out corporate business.145 The religious or politi-
cal interests of each individual shareholder, or shareholders in the aggregate, do 
                                                        
139  Butler and Ribstein note that when some owners of large blocks of shares have so much 
wealth tied up in a firm, they cannot afford to be ignorant about governance. This changes 
the role of the shareholder and the information level, but not the general operation of the 
corporation or its structure. Id. at 9. 
140  See, e.g., Hoepner v. Wachovia Corp., No. 01CVS005106, 2001 WL 34000145, at *1 
(N.C. Sup. Ct. 2001). 
141  Gordon, supra note 34, at 372 (“Given the ‘personal’ nature of these rights, the Contin-
gent Corporation’s ability to ‘have’ some particular cultural, racial, or political characteristic 
depends, to a not-insignificant extent, upon perceptions of the nature of ownership.”). 
142  See discussion supra notes 82–89. 
143  BLAIR, supra note 41, at 147–48, 169 (discussing market share and power of institutional 
investors and tendency to serve their own interests). Those investing outside of an institu-
tion, or beyond a corporation’s founders or management group, do not hold a majority or 
even a plurality sufficient to exercise control of the corporation through the limited ways 
shareholders may act. See also supra notes 121–23 (discussing shareholder power). 
144  See, e.g., Stout, supra note 112, at 257–58 (noting that the corporate form minimizes 
risks from whims of other investors through capital lock-in. The corporation protects share-
holders from each other for the good of the corporation in a way that is not present in a part-
nership). The process of protecting shareholders from each other for the good of the corpora-
tion inherently means the corporation is a separate entity. Directors are not just focused on 
what is good for the majority, but what allows the corporation to continue. See, e.g., Andrew 
A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 764, 768–69 (2012) (The-
orizing that because corporation is perpetual by statute, corporation obligated to act with 
long term view on behalf of future not just current shareholders). 
145  Schwartz, supra note 144, at 767. Directors owe fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to 
the corporation and shareholders. See Pollman, Constitutionalizing, supra note 5, at 651 
(providing an overview of the history of fiduciary duties). 
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not motivate the actions of the directors and officers of the corporation. Instead, 
the directors and officers are motivated to advance the goals of the corporation, 
and to act in the best interest of the corporation, without knowledge or regard to 
the personal opinions of shareholders.146 The directors and officers are not re-
quired to seek out and adhere to the moral, legal, or business whims of the ma-
jority of the shareholders. 
By design, shareholders have very little influence over the management of 
a corporation.147 This is confirmed by the fact that despite the recent financial 
industry scandals and greater public scrutiny of corporate behavior, there have 
been mostly unsuccessful attempts at increasing shareholder influence.148 
Shareholders have not been aware of most of the wrongful actions of corporate 
directors and officers.149 If they had been aware, there is little that a single 
shareholder can do outside of selling shares.150 Even corporate actions are fur-
ther limited by corporate statutes and bylaws, which allow for boards to cir-
cumvent shareholder proposals.151 Additionally, the procedural requirements to 
advance a claim in court against the directors require a heightened pleading 
standard, making litigation a costly option that is typically not worthwhile.152 
When shareholders push for a voice in the corporation, it rarely results in cor-
porate change.153 
In fact, to bend to the will of shareholders and take actions that are not in 
the best interest of the corporation may subject directors and officers to liability 
for breach of fiduciary duties.154 By force of statute and common law, boards 
and corporate officers are tasked with looking out for the best interest of the 
corporation.155 The corporate law provided by the state requires directors and 
officers to make sound business decisions, to avoid engaging in wasteful activi-
ty, and to remain diligent in the administration of corporate duties.156 Although 
                                                        
146  See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 110, at 204–06, 208. 
147  See Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 63, at 13. 
148  See, e.g., BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 72, at 10 (discussing rational ignorance); 
FAIRFAX, supra note 113, at 35 (discussing the Wall Street Rule); Belinfanti & Stout, supra 
note 63, at 17 n.76 (noting that many recent scandals may have been caused by an unhealthy 
management focus on immediate results instead of operation of the corporation for the long-
term). 
149  See Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 63, at 17 n.76. 
150  See sources cited supra note 116 (discussing the limited ways shareholders may act). 
151  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 222(a) (2009); see also Goggin v. Vermillion, Inc., No. 
6465-VCN, 2011 WL 2347704, at *4 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
152  See DEL. CT. CH. R. 23.1; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (dis-
cussing requirements for a shareholder derivative lawsuit). 
153  See FAIRFAX, supra note 113; see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 110, at 242–43 (little evi-
dence that shareholder activism mattered; investor activism remains rare). 
154  See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30–.31. 
155  See Schwartz, supra note 144, at 809; see also Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 63, at 607 
(The shareholder is only one, and not necessarily the most important, of the many different 
groups that should be considered when managing a corporation). 
156  Schwartz, supra note 144, at 809. 
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the directors and officers are agents and fiduciaries of the corporation and 
shareholders, once authorized, the decisions of directors and officers need not 
comply with shareholder interests day-to-day. 
Directors are beholden to protecting the corporation and all shareholders—
both current and future.157 In looking out for this best interest, corporations 
must give deference to the law and make business decisions based on the mar-
ket, but not to the desires of the shareholders.158 If complying with laws of gen-
eral application is contrary to the wishes of shareholders, the legal duties super-
sede the shareholder whims.159 Should the directors choose to ignore experts 
and the realities of the market and instead cede to shareholder control, they 
could face liability if the corporation or shareholders themselves suffer a 
loss.160 
With these realities in mind, many of the Court’s concerns regarding rights 
particular to human beings are misplaced. If a right is one which a corporation 
personally cannot enjoy, extending the right to the corporation as a proxy for 
“the people” is improper. If the fiduciary interests and the corporation’s exist-
ence are protected, the danger of the state restraining exercise of religion or si-
lencing speech is not a reality. There’s no danger of restraining exercise of reli-
gion unless the purpose of the corporation itself is frustrated.161 
Courts are allowed to question the sanctity of corporate beliefs in a way 
that is prohibited in analysis of human beliefs because the corporation is not a 
natural person.162 When the realities of corporate governance are combined 
with the realities of corporate existence, there is room for the state to place lim-
its on the corporation that would not be allowed for natural persons.163 Court 
decisions based on the aggregate theory that extend rights that only a corporeal 
natural person can enjoy are offering duplicative protection to a class of indi-
viduals protected adequately elsewhere. This is because humans do not lose 
                                                        
157  See id. at 777–79. 
158  Id. at 771; see also Blair & Stout, supra note 6, at 298. 
159  Blair & Stout, supra note 6, at 288, 291. Because of the fiduciary duties of the directors, 
which bind them to protect the interests of the corporation, when application of the hybrid 
theory denies the corporation the ability to exercise a right, it is not depriving individuals of 
a constitutional right by mere operation of contract or agreement. 
160  See supra notes 150–56. 
161  Under the hybrid theory, the “purpose” of the corporation would be defined both by the 
official formation documents (articles of incorporation, charter, bylaws) as well as other 
documents representing the purpose of the corporation, including board resolutions, corpo-
rate policies, and corporate public statements. Should a corporation represent its religious 
purpose through documents and actions, then those rights for the corporation would be pro-
tected. The hybrid theory does not, however, protect the rights of “the people” who make up 
the corporation because the corporation is the person. 
162  See Winkler, supra note 12, at 866 (corporations have free speech rights more limited 
than those held by individuals, and that have never been equal). 
163  See infra notes 230–234 and accompanying text (describing the differences between al-
lowable classifications of natural persons and artificial persons). 
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their status when they put assets into or manage a corporation.164 The aggregate 
theory gives rights to corporations they do not deserve because they physically 
cannot enjoy them.165 
III. PART THREE: MISAPPLICATION OF THE AGGREGATE THEORY 
The portions of the Citizens United decision that advance the idea that the 
corporation is a stand-alone entity does reflect the reality of corporate opera-
tions, but the premise that courts must protect the rights of shareholders acting 
in the aggregate is divorced from that reality.166 When forming a corporation, 
the incorporators make a choice of whether to go with default rules for share-
holder involvement, to limit shareholder rights beyond the default terms, or to 
allow shareholders greater power through voting measures and other changes to 
corporate structure.167 The incorporators and initial investors have the full array 
of terms and conditions at their disposal, within the limits of corporate and se-
curities law, and typically they choose to limit shareholder involvement.168 
These parties make a deliberate choice, and often choose to limit shareholder 
power as much as possible to protect the operation of the corporation from 
shareholder aggression.169 By operation of law and contract, shareholders are 
divorced from the handling of their investment.170 
For investors who are not the initial founders or are shareholders of a for-
profit, publicly-traded corporation, rights are not the result of the collective de-
cisions of an association of citizens.171 Instead, their rights are defined and 
planned at the outset of incorporation, and they may either accept the terms and 
purchase a financial stake in the corporation, or reject them by refusing to pur-
                                                        
164  See Winkler, supra note 12, at 873 (“Even if the fictional entity . . . did not have constitu-
tional rights . . . the actual persons behind the corporation—as John Marshall recognized al-
most 200 years ago—will continue to have them.”). 
165  See, e.g., Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327, 
337 (2014) (“The problem with the aggregate theory . . . is that the primary theoretical justi-
fication for limited liability is the separation of ownership and control by way of statutorily 
designated overseers of corporate activity—the board of directors. If one ignores this separa-
tion and boils the corporation down to its shareholder owners, then one is essentially back to 
a form of general partnership. . . .”). Under the hybrid theory, a corporation like Ruby, Inc. 
or Hobby Lobby could “enjoy” religion if manifestations of the corporation itself show that 
the corporation is engaging in religious exercise. The corporations could not avail them-
selves of freedom of religion merely because the founders, directors, officers, and employees 
adhere to a given religion. 
166  See supra Section I.B. 
167  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109, 211 (2018) limits shareholder voting rights to election of 
directors, approval of charter and bylaw amendments, and matters that fundamentally change 
the structure of the corporation such as mergers, voluntary dissolution, or selling all of the 
corporation’s assets. See also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 110, at 204. 
168  See Schwartz, supra note 133, at 245–48. 
169  Id. at 247–48; see also supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
170  See Schwartz, supra note 133, at 246–48. 
171  See id. at 238, 243–45. 
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chase the stock.172 There are no accidental corporations and there are no acci-
dental shareholders.173 Shareholders exercise their power when they deliberate-
ly choose to invest in the corporate form.174 This affirmative choice represents 
an agreement to abandon control and entrust operations to directors and offic-
ers.175 Typically, when shareholders are disappointed in corporate performance, 
they express their opinion by selling shares.176 Yet, the Court, through the ag-
gregate theory, continue to consider the rights of shareholders, assigning them 
the role of the people who make up the corporation, when analyzing corporate 
rights.177 
This Part analyzes the misuse of the aggregate theory, considering the true 
nature of the role of shareholders in the corporation. There is minimal share-
holder representation in corporate action, outside of their passive acceptance of 
the corporation’s goals and the management of the directors and officers repre-
sented by the stock purchase.178 The nature of corporate governance is distorted 
in court decisions that seek to grant constitutional rights to corporations. For 
these reasons, cases like Citizens United, which grant corporations rights based 
on the rights of the individuals who make up the corporation, are based on a 
misconception about the nature of corporate rights. 
A. Historical Use of the Aggregate Theory 
Both scholars and the courts have expressed concern about the nature of 
corporate rights. There has also been concern about the ability of the corpora-
tion to force a deviation from the original purpose of a constitutional right by 
virtue of the mere size and impact of corporations.179 Like Justice Steven’s dis-
sent in Citizens United, these concerns are often expressed in the dissent of ma-
jor court decisions and rely on the artificial entity theory to justify limita-
tions.180 Majority opinions tend to disregard the dangers posed by corporate 
                                                        
172  See id. 
173  Id. at 243–44. 
174  Id. at 271. 
175  Id. 
176  Notably, in today’s secondary market selling shares does not result in a reduction of cor-
porate assets. See Stout, supra note 112, at 254. 
177  See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014); Citizens 
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 336–37, 386 (2010). 
178  See supra note 111. 
179  See Garrett, supra note 5, at 164 (providing a survey of corporate due process rights). 
Garrett states that constitutional rights may be strongest when asserted by groups and not just 
individuals. The cost of allowing artificial entities to assert rights at the expense of individu-
als without adequate representation can be too great for a constitutional democracy to permit. 
See Brief of Amici Curiae Corporate Law Professors in Support of Respondents, supra note 
117, at 21–24 (noting the risks of market manipulation for competitive reasons if corpora-
tions are allowed to exempt themselves from generally applicable laws based on the sincere-
ly held beliefs of shareholders and others who make up the corporation). 
180  See, e.g., Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 90 (1938) (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
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influence, relying on the aggregate theory to advance the rights of shareholders, 
and disregarding the impact of the corporation itself.181 After nearly 150 years 
of expanding, arguably unjustifiably, corporate constitutional rights, the per-
ceived overreach of Citizens United signals an opportunity to deviate from the 
centuries-old pattern of blurring the line between corporations and natural per-
sons, and of frustrating the purpose of constitutional rights.182 
Before cases like Citizens United and Hobby Lobby, the aggregate theory 
was primarily used to protect the property rights of shareholders as an associa-
tion of citizens under the Due Process Clause.183 The Court was concerned with 
the idea of taking property from individuals simply because they unite in the 
corporate form.184 This concern, however, was misplaced. In all scenarios, the 
rights of the corporation were adequately protected through operation of the ar-
tificial entity theory.185 The state granted property rights to the corporation at 
the time of charter because property rights are incidental to the corporation’s 
existence; thus, the state could not deny property rights after the corporation 
was formed.186 This is similar to the holding for contractual rights in Dart-
mouth. There, Chief Justice Marshall noted that a state could not place limits on 
rights once granted.187 
Many of the due process property decisions involve the railroad industry. 
For example, in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, 
the Court held that a corporation’s property could not be taxed differently from 
that of a natural person.188 In San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., a railroad case that 
preceded Santa Clara, a Federal District Court in California held, “whenever a 
provision of the constitution, or of a law, guaranties to persons the enjoyment 
of property, or affords to them means for its protection, or prohibits legislation 
                                                        
181  See Tucker, supra note 3, at 501–05 (discussing the evolution of the Court’s treatment of 
corporations to recognize the rights of the people who make up the corporation). 
182  See Chatman, supra note 2, at 60–62 (discussing the Court’s history expanding corporate 
rights without justification). If the Court grants rights to corporations equal to the rights of 
human beings, there is a danger of giving a corporation rights at the expense of the human 
beings the constitution is designed to protect. See also Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 63, at 
587 (“Aggregate theory captures the reality that corporations must act and make decisions 
through their human agents. However, the aggregate approach raises several challenging 
questions, such as which human agents/natural persons should we aggregate? Everyone in-
volved in the corporate enterprise? Or perhaps only the board, executives, and shareholders? 
And if so, today’s shareholders, or the company’s original shareholders? As this last ques-
tion suggests, the notion of perpetual corporate life is hard to reconcile with an aggregation 
theory.”). 
183  Chatman, supra note 2, at 60; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 1649. (“[T]he cor-
porate personhood doctrine of Santa Clara represented an efficient way for the corporation 
to assert the property rights of its shareholders.”); Pollman, supra note 5, at 658–59 (noting 
the recognition of equal protection and due process rights based on the aggregate theory). 
184  See Chatman, supra note 2, at 60–61. 
185  Id. at 62–63. 
186  Id. at 60–61. 
187  Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)518, 636−37 (1819). 
188  Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 416 (1886). 
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injuriously affecting it, the benefits of the provision extend to corporations.”189 
While early courts viewed parts of due process for corporations as so essential 
that it did not need justification or explanation, early courts explicitly limited 
full expansion of corporate rights through the aggregate theory, excluding 
“purely personal” rights. The courts carefully limited expansion, carving out 
life or liberty, noting that those are only rights that natural persons may en-
joy.190 Early cases drew distinctions amongst actors in a way that may be out of 
line with more recent holdings.191 
Even the earliest decisions demonstrate that the aggregate theory is not 
necessary to adequately protect any of the rights of the corporation, including 
property rights.192 Many of these cases also indicate the corporation’s property 
rights as operation of the artificial entity theory.193 By referencing the rights of 
the corporation itself, either through artificial entity or real entity theory, these 
early decisions also demonstrated that protection of the property rights of the 
people who make up the corporation is misplaced and unnecessary. The proper-
ty protected in the railroad cases is the property held by corporations, not 
shareholders. Further, many scholars have noted that “strict property rights” 
cannot be applied to the ownership rights of the modern shareholder of large 
corporations due to the secondary nature of share ownership.194 The operation 
of the modern corporation confirms that granting rights in the aggregate disre-
gards the realities of corporate governance.195 
                                                        
189  In addition to the aggregate theory, in Santa Clara and San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 13 
F. 722, 744 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), the Court also granted corporations rights under the artificial 
entity theory. The corporations were granted property rights during chartering: a state may 
not impose unconstitutional limits on rights which it has granted. See San Mateo, 13 F. at 
744 (“It would be a most singular result if a constitutional provision intended for the protec-
tion of every person against partial and discriminating legislation by the states, should cease 
to exert such protection the moment the person becomes a member of a corporation. We 
cannot accept such a conclusion.”). 
190  See Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 13 F. Cas. 67, 68 (D. La. 1870) (“Only natural persons can 
be born or naturalized; only natural persons can be deprived of life or liberty; so that it is 
clear that artificial persons are excluded from the provisions of the first two clauses. . . .”). 
191  See Chatman, supra note 2, at 60−62 (discussing historical limits on corporate person-
hood). 
192  Id. 
193  See San Mateo, 13 F. at 744. 
194  See Berle, supra note 115, at 101−02 (The new role of shareholders has created a new 
form of property. Shareholders are not motivated by entrepreneurship, but stock has more 
socio-political implications. Corporations do not need the shareholder’s funds to operate, 
taking the relationship outside the parameters of traditional economic relationships); Wein-
stein, supra note 57, at 310 (noting that by renouncing control and responsibility to man-
agement, shareholders have given up the right to have the corporation managed in their in-
terest); Pollman, Constitutionalizing, supra note 5, at 672−73 (noting the flawed assumption 
that corporations are all associational in nature). 
195  See discussion supra Section II.A.; see also Gindis, supra note 126, at 274 (The corpora-
tion is not an object of property rights. Humans may own shares of a corporation, but no per-
son possesses the corporation itself). 
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B. The Aggregate Theory in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby 
In Citizens United, Scalia and the majority did not consider whether the 
speech rights under consideration could be enjoyed only by natural persons, 
and skipped the question of whether corporations have the First Amendment 
right at all.196 Assuming that a corporation’s First Amendment rights exist, the 
Court advocated for the position of focusing on the right, not on who is invok-
ing the right.197 While a corporation is not an actual citizen and cannot vote, the 
majority ignored these facts, holding that the corporate voice is vital to political 
discourse.198 Because the corporation is capable of speech protected by the 
Constitution, the First Amendment right of a corporation could not be limited 
simply because the words were not spoken by a citizen or a natural person.199 
Thus, a corporation is capable of speech, capable of having its speech infringed 
upon by the state, and deserves the same level of protection as any speaker 
from such infringements.200 This premise is not found in the text of the Consti-
tution or in precedent.201 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores202 illustrates how Citizens United declara-
tions combined with the aggregate theory continues to improperly expand 
rights based on incorrect beliefs regarding corporate governance.203 Hobby 
Lobby suggested corporate rights are the pass through rights of the owners.204 A 
corporation has constitutional rights as long as the persons making up the cor-
                                                        
196  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 84, at 33 (statement of Sotomayor, J.). 
197  See supra notes 81−83 and accompanying text. 
198  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010). 
199  Id. 
200  Id. 
201  While courts have granted corporations free speech rights as far back as Chief Justice 
Marshall in Dandridge, those rights were linked to how the corporation itself can speak—
through money, corporate writings. Those who are in support of the holding in Citizens 
United emphasize that it is an opinion about the First Amendment, not a statement about 
corporate law. See, e.g., Floyd Abrams, Citizens United and Its Critics, 120 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 77 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/citizens-united-and-its-critics [https://per 
ma.cc/7BGS-FMMK]. The precedence cited by the Court in  United does support First 
Amendment rights for corporations, but tends toward speech that the corporation itself can 
engage in. Citizens United takes these previous holdings, affirming free speech for corpora-
tion, and extrapolates to find that when analyzing rights, a court must ignore the nature of the 
speaker. By ignoring corporate personhood, the Court is able to declare these cases as right-
ful precedence for the outcome of Citizens United. This, in essence, is why personhood mat-
ters. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2. 
202  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
203  Id. at 2768−69. While Hobby Lobby is viewed by some to be an outlier because it applies 
to a closely held corporation with a religious purpose, it is informative for how the Court 
will analyze corporate personhood. Additionally, recent cases show the holding is expanding 
beyond what the court indicated. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
204  See Garrett, supra note 5, at 96; see also June Carbone & Nancy Levit, The Death of the 
Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. 963, 1017−18 (2017) (Hobby Lobby erodes the social status of the 
corporation by reducing it to an entity focused on the interests of its owners). 
18 NEV. L.J. 811, CHATMAN  - FINAL 5/15/18  12:28 PM 
Spring 2018] COPORATE PERSONHOOD 843 
poration have an indirect benefit.205 This use of the aggregate theory ignores the 
realities of the corporate form, conflating for-profit companies with non-profit 
religious organizations, and corporations with partnerships; this allows share-
holders to have it both ways.206 The Hobby Lobby Court would have us believe 
these distinctions are of no consequence.207 Justice Alito and the majority pro-
posed that incorporators and shareholders can choose the profit maximizing, 
dividend generating for-profit form, and apprise themselves of limited liability, 
yet also protect their personal religious and speech rights indirectly through the 
corporation.208 
It is not clear from the Hobby Lobby holding if the Court is referring spe-
cifically to a statutory close corporation, or merely a corporation that is not 
publicly traded.209 In a close corporation, the shareholders view themselves as 
more than just shareholders and are instead involved in the management of the 
business.210 Close corporations have thirty or fewer shareholders, one or more 
restrictions on transfer, are not registered with the SEC, and make an explicit 
election to be governed by the close corporation provision of the Delaware 
General Corporate Law § 342.211 Shareholders expect to be actively involved in 
management and operation of the corporation.212 
Even if the Court is referring to close corporations, this should not change 
how corporate rights are perceived in Hobby Lobby.213 Close corporation 
founders are still choosing to avail themselves of the benefit of the corporate 
form. Their duties are greater than shareholders in a larger corporation, but 
those duties, based on the agency relationship among shareholders, are still 
owed to other shareholders and the corporation itself, not third parties.214 The 
shareholders in a close corporation are wearing many hats. They can be both 
investors and managers. The roles assumed by shareholders in close corpora-
                                                        
205  Id. at 964 (citing Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768). 
206  Garrett, supra note 5, at 145. 
207  Hobby Lobby, 132 S. Ct. at 2769. 
208  Id. at 2769−70. 
209  The Department of Labor, Department of Treasury, and Health and Human Services de-
fined “closely held” for purposes of the Affordable Care Act following the Hobby Lobby de-
cision. See Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 80 
Fed. Reg. 134, 41323 (July 14, 2015). 
210  F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, 1 O’NEAL’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.07, at 
29–30 (3d. ed. 2002). 
211  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 350, 351, 355 (2017). Shareholders govern the business and 
affairs entirely. A minority of shareholders can be given the power to dissolve. 
212  O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 210. 
213  Hobby Lobby held that even a for-profit, non-religious corporation may have religion as a 
purpose. If the corporation has such purpose, the corporation also has religious rights under 
the First Amendment. A closely held, for-profit corporation may function as a reflection and 
extension of the beliefs held by an aggregate of the owners. 134 S. Ct. at 2768−69, 2774−75. 
214  See Stout, supra note 112, at 261 (Controlling shareholders in a close corporation have a 
duty not to use their control over the corporation to cause the corporation to make payments 
to them that the minority shareholders do not receive). 
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tions, however, do not change the nature of the corporation itself.215 The dis-
tinctions between a more traditional corporation and a close corporation are re-
flective of the incorporators’ freedom to contract, as they chose the business 
form most representative of their goals. 
It is also a reflection of the state’s right to define business entities through 
statutes. Even in a close corporation, the corporation is still legally separate 
from individuals.216 The close corporation also maintains other characteristics 
of a corporation, including perpetual life.217 Yet, the aggregate theory, as ad-
vanced by the Hobby Lobby majority, advocates for the opposite. The Court 
suggests that while the responsibilities and obligations of individuals are altered 
by the corporate form, the rights are not.218 The close corporation is still a cor-
poration—the election does not change the nature of the corporation itself. If 
we would not give corporate rights based on the interests of directors and offic-
ers alone in public or large corporations, we should not extend rights through 
the aggregate theory to shareholders of a close corporation. The only difference 
between close corporations and traditional corporations is the management 
structure, not the corporate relationship with the government or third parties.219 
Allowing the incorporators and shareholders to back track when convenient 
should not be permissible.  
The application of the aggregate theory in more recent holdings gives di-
rectors and officers constitutional protections simply because they serve as 
agents and fiduciaries for the corporation. As discussed in the first Section of 
this Part, since the Court is not protecting shareholders with the aggregate theo-
ry, the Court is giving double protection to an elite class of persons serving as 
directors and officers.220 If the Court’s actions offer any protection to share-
holders, such protections are duplicative rights earned simply by investments 
                                                        
215  See, e.g., Gindis, supra note 126, at 261 (Individuals assume roles on behalf of a corpora-
tion, and are even the face of the business, but that does not alter the definition of the corpo-
ration. They are assuming the roles on behalf of a real entity. The corporation is a coherent 
and stable whole). 
216  See, e.g., BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 72, at 10 (Close corporation is like a partner-
ship choice for purpose of managing and monitoring agents. The ownership and control are 
not separate, so the advantage is fewer agency costs. However, the shareholders lose the 
benefits of being a public corporation, but not the benefits of the corporation generally); see 
also Garrett, supra note 5, at 146 (“[N]othing could be more fundamental to modern corpo-
rate law than the complete separation of the owners from the legal entity itself. . . . [L]egal 
separateness is the point of creating a corporation.”). 
217  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 343 (2017) (A close corporation is formed in accordance 
with general corporate laws, with the exception that the name shall state that it is a close cor-
poration and shall include the provisions of § 343); § 102(a)(5) (A certificate of incorpora-
tion defaults to perpetual existence). 
218  See discussion supra notes 199−205. 
219  See, e.g., infra note 221. 
220  See discussion supra Section II.A. See also Tucker, supra note 3, at 530 (noting the prob-
lems with applying the aggregate to corporate political speech). 
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and wealth.221 The Court’s holdings are based on the protection of rights that 
are impossible to exercise without a physical body and do not exist independent 
of the natural persons behind the corporation.222 To continue the use of the ag-
gregate theory found in Hobby Lobby and Citizens United is to continually 
over-represent shareholders and management. 
Applying the aggregate theory also disregards the intentions of state legis-
latures when they create corporations through statutes. The corporation is a 
creature of the state, meaning that when courts decide the constitutional rights 
of the artificial entity, they are deciding the rights of something that would not 
exist without an exercise of state power. A corporation should only have reli-
gious or speech rights, such as that of a person, if the states have defined corpo-
rations in way that allows for such an interpretation. Looking past what states 
intend the corporation to be and extending rights based on the people who 
make up the corporation disregards the autonomy and power of the state to de-
fine its creation.223 It voids the agreement that went into effect between the state 
and corporate founders when the corporation was formed. 
Citizens United’s use of the aggregate theory to protect the rights of the in-
dividuals who make up the corporation and the lack of consideration given to 
the entity exercising the right is flawed in two respects. First, it ignores that 
there are legal, state defined differences between corporations, natural persons, 
and other business entities. Then, it applies a theory of the corporation that does 
not reflect the realities of corporate governance. Because Citizens United incor-
rectly defined the corporation, it also incorrectly analyzed the corporation’s 
rights. The correct approach to corporate personhood and corporate rights in-
corporates the realities of corporate existence, defers to the state definitions of 
the entity, and honors the choices made by corporate founders. The next Part 
proposes a way forward that properly considers what a corporation is when de-
termining corporate rights. 
                                                        
221  The Court has rejected the “shareholder protection” rationale due to its over-and under-
inclusiveness. See Tucker, supra note 3, at 514–15 (discussing the Court’s rejection of 
shareholder protection in First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792−95, and in Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361 (2010)). As discussed in 
supra Section II.A., majority shareholders tend to be corporate founders and institutional 
investors, or corporate management—not individuals purchasing on the open market. The 
corporate management and majority investor classes either have institutional backing or the 
wealth necessary to be a party of the class. 
222  Historically, speech rights of corporations have been acknowledged under the real entity 
theory when the corporation speaks in ways in which a corporation can speak—writings and 
official corporate statements. See, e.g., Bank of the United States v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 
Wheat.) 64, 91−92 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting); discussion supra Section I.A. Under 
the hybrid theory, speech rights would receive the same level of protection. 
223  See, e.g., Blair & Pollman, supra note 49. 
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IV. PART FOUR: THE HYBRID THEORY AND THE CORPORATE PERSONHOOD 
TWO-STEP 
The silver lining of the Citizens United decision is that it has been a cata-
lyst in a movement to explore what a corporation is and to find a solution that 
defines the corporation in a way that the people, through empowerment of the 
state, can support. Any displeasure with the nature of corporate rights can be 
remedied by allowing states to define their creation.224 The Court’s precedent, 
as far back as Chief Justice John Marshall in Dartmouth, makes it clear that 
states can redefine its creation—the corporation.225 This is because the Court is 
deciding the rights of an artificial entity that would not exist without state pow-
er, but whose rights, both intentional and incidental, must be acknowledged 
once formed. The Court cannot divorce an analysis of corporate constitutional 
rights from an analysis of the legal status of corporations. The role of the Court 
should be to simply interpret what the state intends. 
The corporation is the creature of the state; therefore, states have the power 
to fix the corporate personhood flaws in cases like Citizens United.226 States 
have made judgments about the nuances of the corporate form, creating the 
corporation, and defining the rights and responsibilities of incorporators, share-
holders, directors, and officers.227 In exchange for the benefits of a corporation, 
the humans who choose to unite in the corporate form create an entity com-
pletely separate from themselves.228 The entity created through this collabora-
tion of the state and the natural person creates a new legal fiction embodied 
with its own rights, limitations, and responsibilities.229 Determining the rights 
                                                        
224  For decades, many have proposed going further by amending the Constitution to clearly 
state that corporations are not persons. For example, in 1988 Ralph Nader authored a piece 
in the New York Times profiling the history of corporate constitutional rights and advocating 
for a change. See Ralph Nader & Carl J. Mayer, Corporations Are Not Persons, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 9, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/09/opinion/corporations-are-not-persons.ht 
ml [https://perma.cc/manage/create?folder=13520-41141]. 
225  Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819). 
226  Scholars have agreed that Citizens United is an opportunity for state action. See, e.g., 
Pollman, Constitutionalizing, supra note 5, at 657 (Citizens United and Hobby Lobby are a 
paradigm shift for the Court. They represent an opportunity for state law to resolve disputes 
among corporate participants); Kent Greenfield, In Defense of Corporate Persons, 30 
CONST. COMMENT. 309, 327−32 (2015) (Governance rules can alleviate concerns over corpo-
rate political speech). The approach of relying on the states, however, does not guarantee 
that efforts will be taken to protect the rights of individuals over corporations. 
227  See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am. 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987) (Court has made nu-
merous proclamations regarding constitutional rights over the years, it is clear that “the cor-
poration . . . owes its existence and attributes to state law.”). See also Mayer, supra note 40, 
at 584 n.36 (citing T. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 11 (1984)); Garrett, supra note 5, 
at 105. 
228  Garrett, supra note 5, at 108. 
229  Since corporations are creatures of the state, federal courts historically have been leery of 
interfering with what was defined by the states under law. See Garrett, supra note 5, at 105; 
Ciepley, supra note 77, at 225−42 (Corporations are constituted by government. They thus 
have no preexisting rights to reserve. Without reserved rights, and without any express rights 
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associated with this special relationship requires a court to analyze the facts and 
give consideration to evidence of the corporation’s formation and operations.  
This Part proposes a way forward in corporate rights analysis by using the 
two-step analysis to fully recognize the hybrid nature of the corporation. First, 
this Part defines what is involved should the Court start at step one in its analy-
sis of the corporate form as it exists now. Then, this Part discusses the true na-
ture of the corporation, considering step one analysis, to highlight how states 
can redefine their creation as stand-alone new entities that exist at the pleasure 
of the state, a hybrid of artificial and real entity theory. It concludes by apply-
ing the hybrid theory to Ruby, Inc. 
A. Defining Step One: Considering the True Nature of the Corporation 
The Constitution is written for human beings, not entities. To give corpora-
tions rights, a fiction must be created to imprint human characteristics onto the 
corporation. Corporate rights are a fact question that will always require courts 
to engage in a fact-intensive analysis because of the nature of corporate person-
hood. Step one of the two-step analysis requires the Court to examine how the 
corporation is founded, and how the corporation operates. Corporate person-
hood and corporate rights cannot be presumed, especially rights based on be-
liefs such as religion. If a clear proclamation of rights is desired, outside of the 
two-step analysis, state and federal legislature must take similar steps regarding 
the definition of rights that accompany personhood. 
To define the corporate person and other artificial persons, it is helpful to 
consider how we define natural persons. The logical definition of person in-
cludes any human being possessing a physical body, without concern for age, 
gender, race, or nationality.230 How to classify natural persons for legal purpos-
es is in many ways as logical as how to define them. States categorize people 
by age, mental capacity, and other constitutionally acceptable legal classifica-
tions.231 When states classify persons, however, they are working with entities 
that are not creatures of the state, but who are instead the creators of the state.232 
                                                                                                                                 
granted in the constitutional context to corporate entities, it makes no sense for corporations 
to claim constitutional rights against the government). See also Garrett, supra note 5, at 105 
n.43 (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014)) (“discuss-
ing how courts will ‘turn to’ the ‘underlying state’ corporate law when ‘resolving dis-
putes’ ”). 
230  See Person, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARY, https:/en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/per 
son [https://perma.cc/5PMF-XZM5] (last visited Apr. 21, 2018) (defining person as “[a] hu-
man being regarded as an individual”). 
231  To determine whether a classification is legally acceptable, the courts engage in a fact-
intensive analysis of state action, applying one of three tests. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Wein-
berger, 417 U.S. 504 (1974) (“the equal protection clause is violated by discriminatory laws 
relating to the status of birth where classification is justified by no legitimate state interest”). 
232  See Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 375 (1855). 
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As such, the state does not have the power to eliminate a human being’s exist-
ence.233 
In contrast, states do have the power to eliminate a business organization’s 
existence because they are creatures of the state, with rights that are not recog-
nized until the state acknowledges the formation documents, or until they en-
gage in actions the state has deemed to meet the threshold for recognition as a 
business form.234 They are governed by the terms of formation documents and 
the mandatory terms contained in statutes. Because of the state’s role in a com-
pany’s recognition and formation, all formal business entities are hybridized 
artificial entities.235 Once formed, every entity, from the limited partnership to 
the corporation, operates in the world limited by how the state has defined it.236 
                                                        
233  Dodge, 331 U.S. (18 How.) at 375 (“Individuals are not the creatures of the State, but 
constitute it. They come into society with rights, which cannot be invaded without injus-
tice.”). 
234  Id. There are two default entities discussed that operate as alter egos of human beings 
and, therefore, cannot be eliminated by the state. Individuals do business alone and in col-
laboration with other natural persons without the intervention of the state. Sole proprietor-
ships and general partnerships are default entities that exist when one or more individuals do 
business without complying with state filing requirements. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE 
§ 16202(a) (no filings required to form a general partnership and be governed by the default 
rules, but many file a statement of partnership); JAMES F. FOTENOS & EDWARD C. RYBKA, 
CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: CORPORATIONS (2018) §§ 2:3–2:8 (“A sole proprietorship is 
not a legal entity” separate from its owner and does not file a formation document; the owner 
must file a fictitious name certificate if doing business under a name that does not include 
the business owner’s name). States’ laws governing the treatment of sole proprietorships and 
partnerships exist in the common law and in business codes, but the laws do not define the 
entities in the same way that they define entities with limited liability. Even though the state 
may recognize a separate business name or entity, partnerships and sole proprietorships op-
erate like alter egos in their purest forms. 
235  See Thierry Kirat, The Firm Between Law and Economics: An Overview of Selected Le-
gal-economic Scholars of the Past, in THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
ECONOMICS, ACCOUNTING, AND THE LAW, supra note 17, at 131–32 (“A realistic theory of 
the enterprise should be based on two crucial dimensions: its aspect as an entity or institu-
tion, subject to the rules of law and developing its own internal rules; and its role as the op-
erator of the creation and distribution of revenues, and of innovation, thus the economic dy-
namic”). The hybrid theory takes these two factors into consideration by first acknowledging 
that the corporation is in fact a creature of the state, then filling in the gaps of the artificial 
entity/concession theory and recognizing that, once formed, the corporation is a fully func-
tioning independent entity. 
236  Other entities with limited liability, such as the limited partnership (LP), limited liability 
partnership (LLP), limited liability company (LLC) also cannot be formed by default. To 
avoid the fate of sole proprietorships and general partnerships, individuals further formalize 
business relationships, and avail themselves of the benefits of state-defined business forms 
like the corporation, by complying in full with formation requirements found in state busi-
ness codes. Failure to follow statutory requirements results in the corporation being treated 
like a default entity. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 306(c) (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, 
§ 18 (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17 (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15 (2018). The 
business trust, which may be formed by contract alone, does offer some characteristics of 
corporations, including limited liability, but has fallen out of favor since corporate laws have 
been modernized. See Carla L. Reyes, Distributed Autonomous Business Organizations 25–
26 (unpublished draft) (on file with author) (citing John Morley, The Common Law Corpora-
18 NEV. L.J. 811, CHATMAN  - FINAL 5/15/18  12:28 PM 
Spring 2018] COPORATE PERSONHOOD 849 
After formation, to determine how to further define the entity, one must look at 
how it operates and relates to third parties.237 Corporate personhood jurispru-
dence based on the aggregate theory is based on a misunderstanding of corpo-
rate laws and governance because it fails to look at how the corporation oper-
ates after it is formed.238 
Beginning with the decisions and dissents written by Chief Justice Mar-
shall in the 1800s, courts have been starting at step two of corporate-
personhood analysis, defining the corporation as an assumed person then ana-
lyzing the parameters of the right.239 The desire to adequately protect corporate 
interests is largely based on a flawed understanding of corporate governance 
and has resulted in the Court never considering whether the persons being pro-
tected are deserving of, or in need of, additional protection.240 Cases like Citi-
zens United accept corporate rights and personhood status as a foregone con-
clusion, making it difficult to determine at any given moment what rights a 
corporation actually has and what limitations are imposed on those rights.241 
Viewing the corporation as a person is necessary for many laws and regula-
tions to have the intended effect, and typically it is the state or federal legisla-
tures that decide when corporate personhood is necessary. Legislators draft 
state and federal statutes to include the corporation in the definition of a person 
without regard to how such classifications may impact the constitutional defini-
tion or rights of the corporation; instead, they make a conscientious decision 
that a statute should not apply equally to artificial persons.242 The statutes 
                                                                                                                                 
tion: The Power of the Trust in Anglo-American Business History, 116 COL. L. REV. 2145, 
2146 (2016)) (comparing the business trust to the corporation). 
237  Reyes, supra note 236. 
238  See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 72, at 2 (“[V]oting rules of corporations suggest that 
corporations are democratic institutions. . . . [H]owever, the reality of the large corporation is 
far from democratic, because shareholders rarely have the incentive to exercise their legal 
rights.”). See also, e.g., Pollman, Constitutionalizing, supra note 5 (explaining the state role 
in corporate governance); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 253 (explaining founder’s intent 
regarding constitutional and corporate rights). 
239  See discussion supra Part I. See also Winkler, supra note 12, at 867 (Corporate constitu-
tional rights are not based in corporate personhood). 
240  See discussion supra Part II. 
241  See Ciepley, supra note 77, at 222−23 (Professor Ciepley believes the rights of a corpo-
ration are purely contractual, corporations have no constitutional rights). See also Amicus 
Curiae Brief of Corp. & Criminal Law Professors in Support of Petitioners, supra note 4, at 
28 (discussing how application of RFRA to corporations frustrates corporate law). While I 
believe that corporations do have constitutional rights for reasons that are based in more than 
contract, I disagree with the Court’s use of a case that should be founded in corporate law, 
like Citizens United or Hobby Lobby, to make a general point about freedom of speech or 
freedom of religion. The Court’s analysis of those rights in both cases would be correct if it 
was applied to human beings. 
242  See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1) (2012) (Person: “The term ‘person’ shall be construed 
to mean and include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or cor-
poration.”); U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(27) (“ ‘Person’ means an individual, corporation, business 
trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, govern-
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acknowledge that some human activity must be given equal protection, regard-
less of the nature of the person engaging in the activity.243 Many statutes also 
make a distinction between a human actor, a citizen actor, and an artificial enti-
ty actor.244 These distinctions, properly created by state and federal legislators, 
are justified by the Constitution and fit within theories of corporate personhood. 
But when Courts provide the corporations with these same rights as defined by 
statute, they are interpreting the intention of the drafters of the statute.245 Prob-
lems arise in corporate personhood when the courts give rights to corporations 
that states, legislatures, and corporate founders did not intend. 
Through business codes and case law, states have clearly defined the dis-
tinctions between entities and natural persons, along with the differences be-
tween the various business entities.246 If the Court acknowledges how corpora-
tions function, it can develop a corporate personhood theory that grants 
corporate rights equal to natural persons where appropriate, yet upholds appro-
priate state limitations that reflect the nature of the corporation. Viewing the 
corporation as a real entity limited by the realities of the corporate form as de-
fined by state law, may reconcile Citizens United with jurisprudence that allows 
the state to draw distinctions between natural persons and corporations. Recog-
nition of the realities of how corporations are formed and managed will allow 
the Court to start in the right place when analyzing corporate rights, developing 
an accurate and binding theory of corporate personhood. 
The operation of the hybrid theory enables the Court to acknowledge the 
duality of corporate existence. Over the years, Justices have questioned why the 
Court has not started at step one as contemplated by the hybrid approach: de-
termining which constitutional protections are incidental to a corporation’s very 
existence.247 The Court has simply claimed any theory of corporate personhood 
when convenient to grant or deny rights, or to affirm or disagree with a prior 
decision. By starting at step one and defining the corporation, the Court will 
                                                                                                                                 
ment, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, public corporation, or any other 
legal or commercial entity.”). 
243   See 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1); U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(27). 
244  The clearest distinction between natural persons and artificial persons appears in the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 13 F. Cas. 67, 68 (D. La. 1870) (interpret-
ing parts of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply only to human beings: “Only natural per-
sons can be born or naturalized; only natural persons can be deprived of life or liberty; so 
that it is clear that artificial persons are excluded from the provisions of the first two claus-
es. . . .”); see also Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906). Corporations 
have also found that only natural persons may avail themselves of the privilege against self-
incrimination and citizen status for purposes of privileges and immunities protection. See 
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 586 (1839) (privileges and immunities). 
245  Professor Pollman believes that Citizens United and Hobby Lobby look to state corporate 
law as a means for resolving corporate constitutional rights. See Pollman, Constitutionaliz-
ing, supra note 5, at 669. 
246  See supra notes 236−37. 
247  See Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory, supra note 92, at 853; see also Tran-
script of Oral Argument, supra note 84, at 33 (statement of Sotomayor, J.). 
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have less wiggle room and will give corporate constitutional law decisions 
more weight and clarity.248 The beauty of starting at step one is that it has the 
benefit of properly analyzing corporate rights while avoiding blanket proclama-
tions that endanger the proper balance between corporations and third parties. 
This allows the courts to consider how the corporation was formed, how it was 
governed, and what the state and incorporators intended. Corporate rights are 
case-by-case and fact dependent, but the nature of the corporation can be re-
solved by recognizing the corporation’s dual nature. 
Step one requires that the Court give deference to the role of the state by 
considering both the state’s role in formation and the corporation’s stand-alone 
status. Before granting corporate rights the Court should first consider whether 
a right is of the type necessary to protect the corporation itself, not the people 
who make up the corporation.249 As illustrated by the ownership of Hobby 
Lobby and the nature of the business, Hobby Lobby is not a religious entity or 
non-profit whose very existence is based on the exercise of religion.250 Instead 
it is a corporation with a charitable purpose and mission in addition to other 
more common corporate goals.251 Freedom of religion is not incidental to Hob-
by Lobby’s existence, nor is the exercise of religion implicit in what is granted 
by Hobby Lobby’s corporate charter.252 Instead of considering what is inherent 
for the people who found and operate a corporation, the Court should consider 
what is inherent for the corporation itself. 
Step one also requires the Court to consider what rights are incidental to 
the corporate charter. This is because the corporation is an artificial entity 
bound by the rights granted by the state and altered by the foundational corpo-
rate contracts: the corporate charter, bylaws, and resolutions.253 By operation of 
law, actions that are explicitly included in the corporation’s business purpose 
                                                        
248  See Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory, supra note 92, at 859−60; Gordon, 
supra note 34. Professor Chemerinsky notes that it would be difficult to avoid applying the 
Citizens United holding to other contexts related to speech and non-citizens. See 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2. There is similar room to apply the decision in other corporate 
law contexts. See Chatman, supra note 2. 
249  See Gindis, supra note 126, at 266 (“[t]he firm is not simply an aggregate or a collection. 
It is a real integrated entity and a dynamic causal system. . . . Firms are real entities that need 
to be theoretically treated as such.”). 
250  See America’s Largest Private Companies, FORBES.COM, https://www.forbes.com/compa 
nies/hobby-lobby-stores/ [https://perma.cc/6F4T-WKVF] (last visited Apr. 21, 2018); Top-
Private Companies, BIZJOURNALS.COM, http://companies.bizjournals.com/profile/hobby-
lobby/135823/ [https://perma.cc/FK77-DRXL] (last visited Apr. 21, 2018) (Hobby Lobby is 
one of the largest private companies, with over 600 stores that sells arts and craft supplies). 
251  In court filings, Hobby Lobby is described as “an arts-and-crafts chain,” and a closely 
held family business organized as a general corporation under Oklahoma law. See Brief for 
Respondents at 1–2, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-
354 & 13-356). 
252  Id. 
253  See discussion supra Section I.A. 
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cannot be restricted once the charter is granted.254 In addition, actions that are 
required to conduct the business detailed in the charter cannot be restricted.255 
This includes the ability to speak through corporate documents and spending, 
and the ability to contract, own property, and sue and be sued.256 
To start at step one when determining whether a right exists for the corpo-
ration, the Court should also consider what additional responsibilities accom-
pany rights.257 All rights come with responsibilities, but it is difficult to assign 
responsibility to a shareholder, officer, or director when a corporation exercises 
freedom of speech or freedom of religion based on the aggregate theory.258 
Shareholders, directors, and officers are all protected from various levels of re-
sponsibility by the existence of the corporation and the contracts between the 
corporation and its agents and owners.259 A shareholder is only held personally 
liable when a controlling shareholder uses his position to oppress the minority 
shareholder’s interests.260 When the founders of Ruby, Inc. abandon partnership 
for the corporate form, they give up the power to control the corporation 
through their ownership interests, but also give up the responsibilities that ac-
company that control. There are no shareholder duties through the rights they 
exercise in the aggregate, unlike the partners in a partnership.261 As a result of 
the realities of the corporate form, the Court extends additional rights to share-
holders, officers, and directors without any additional responsibilities.262 
As is evident from the earliest corporate decisions, clearly the founders and 
early courts envisioned a corporation subject to some level of state control.263 
Two-step analysis allows the Court to continue to advance the principal that the 
corporation that credits its existence to terms mandated by the state should also 
be subject to the control of the state, while also allowing the Court to 
                                                        
254  Id. 
255  Id. 
256  Prior to Citizens United, the courts recognized that corporations have First Amendment 
rights to freedom of speech and freedom of the press, Fifth Amendment protection from un-
reasonable takings, Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable search and seizure, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 
435 U.S. 765, 775−76, 778 n.14 (1978) (First Amendment); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 
(1906) (Fourth Amendment); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) 
(Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment); Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 409−10 
(1886) (Fourteenth Amendment). 
257  See, e.g., Roger M. Michalski, Rights Come with Responsibilities: Personal Jurisdiction 
in the Age of Corporate Personhood, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125, 126–27 (2013). 
258  Id. at 136−37. See also, Chatman, supra note 2, at 87. 
259  See discussion, supra Section II.A. 
260  See FAIRFAX, supra note 113, at 26. See also supra notes 205−11 and accompanying text. 
261  See discussion, supra Section II.A. 
262  Under aggregate theory some rights are extended to corporations through the people who 
make up the firm, but under ethical rules, representation and privileges belong to the corpo-
ration not the employees, officers, or directors. How can the corporation assume the right on 
behalf of the individuals, but not be required to protect the individuals when a violation oc-
curs? See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1983). 
263  See discussion, supra Section I.A. 
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acknowledge that by granting the corporation’s existence the state creates a 
new independent entity with rights incidental to that existence.264 By looking at 
the way corporations are formed and operate, the Court may advance a cohe-
sive theory of corporations that grants rights to corporations when required, but 
does not presume, as in Citizens United,265 that corporations must be equal to 
natural persons in all ways. The hybrid theory, with its two-step analysis and 
embodiment of the dual nature of corporate existence, provides the framework 
necessary to properly analyze corporate rights. 
B. A Hybrid Theory 
The enduring scholarly debate on corporate personhood disincentivizes the 
Court from stating explicitly what theory it subscribes to at any given mo-
ment.266 Once the Court identifies a theory, the decision faces immediate scru-
tiny by scholars who oppose the theory referenced.267 Much of the personhood-
based criticism and support of Citizens United is based on how it reinforces a 
chosen corporate-personhood theory. The reality is that corporations, like natu-
ral persons, are no single thing.268 Just as a human being can be both a child and 
a parent, a corporation has elements of more than one personhood theory de-
pending on the context.269 This phenomenon is reinforced by the fact that cor-
porate personhood is itself a legal fiction. To properly define the corporation’s 
personhood in order to determine its access to constitutional rights, we must 
properly acknowledge the parameters used by legislators and the corporate 
founders to define the corporation’s purpose. 
Those opposed to Citizens United that advocate to eliminate the constitu-
tional rights of the corporation through complete disavowal of corporate per-
sonhood are unnecessarily overcorrecting, just as efforts by those in support of 
Citizens United to recognize corporations as equal to human beings are analyti-
cally overreaching. 270 The corporation is a real, stand-alone entity, defined by 
the state corporate laws and with rights that come with that position.271 Corpo-
rations have constitutional rights incidental to their right to own property, to 
                                                        
264  Id. 
265  See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
266  See Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory, supra note 92, at 849 n.80. 
267  See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 201. 
268  See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 57 at 33 (“The firm exists in its own right, as a specific 
entity, beyond the changing personalities of shareholders, workers and managers”); see also, 
e.g., Gordon, supra note 34. 
269  Id. 
270  The literature critiquing and supporting Citizens United and corporate personhood gener-
ally is too vast to cite adequately. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 
YALE L.J. 978 (2011); Richard A. Epstein, Citizens United v. FEC: The Constitutional Right 
That Big Corporations Should Have but Do Not Want, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639 
(2011). 
271  See supra notes 56−66 and accompanying text. 
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sue and be sued, enter into contracts, and otherwise function in society.272 
However, extending rights to corporations based on the rights of the citizens 
who make up the corporation in the aggregate is a mischaracterization of the 
corporate form.273 This approach allows the corporation and its natural persons 
to have it both ways, taking advantage of all of the perks of separateness while 
maintaining the rights they would receive if they simply chose to unite in a 
partnership. The corporation functions as a hybrid of the artificial entity theory 
and real entity theory. 
Regardless of the legal fictions created, corporations do not share all as-
pects of natural persons and do not need the same level of protection. Corpora-
tions are embodied with rights based solely on their form. Perpetual life, lim-
ited liability, fully alienable shares, and a transient ephemeral nature all provide 
corporations with greater opportunities legally.274 The persons who make up a 
corporation and who may extend their rights to the corporation through Citizens 
United and Hobby Lobby have not been required to assume responsibility per-
sonally for the obligations of the corporation.275 Many of the foundational pro-
tections of the Constitution are provided to corporations and their directors and 
officers based on the nature of the corporate form.276 Thus, extending all rights 
to the corporation transforms it into a super citizen with more rights and ad-
vantages than the natural person.277 
The corporation is a stand-alone, real entity, with rights tempered by its 
concessions to the state at the time of formation and the physical realities of its 
existence.278 Corporations can sue and be sued, they can enter into contracts, 
they can own property, and, per Citizens United, they can speak through their 
spending. The corporation can do these things without reliance on the rights of 
its natural people—the shareholders, officers, and directors. The corporation is 
also a Dartmouth firm—defined by its agreement with the state, and limited in 
the exercise of some rights by the state-mandated terms of its existence. The 
state could, in theory, abolish corporations, or refuse to allow corporations to 
do business within the state’s borders or obtain rights as foreign corporations in 
a jurisdiction.279 Thus, the corporation’s mere existence is at the pleasure of the 
states. Yet, after states grant corporations the pleasure, the state cannot deny the 
                                                        
272  See supra notes 183–87 and accompanying text. 
273  See discussion, supra Section III.B. 
274  See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 144. 
275  See Michalski, supra note 257. 
276  See discussion, supra Section II.A. 
277  See, e.g., Sprague & Wells, supra note 108. 
278  See also Weinstein, supra note 57 at 33 (“The firm exists in its own right, as a specific 
entity, beyond the changing personalities of shareholders, workers and managers.”). 
279  For a discussion of the fundamental rights of states and the limits placed on Congress by 
the Constitution to infringe on those rights, see Timothy Zick, Statehood as the New Person-
hood: The Discovery of Fundamental “States’ Rights,” 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 213, 255 
(2004) (States have fundamental rights to order their intimate affairs, including the right to 
contract). 
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corporation rights that are inherent and incidental to its legally authorized ex-
istence and activities. This duality allows the corporation to be both an artificial 
entity and a real entity simultaneously, depending on the rights asserted and the 
context. 
A corporation, however, is not a citizen, can never be a citizen per the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and should never be granted rights incidental to citi-
zenship.280 A corporation is not born and it lacks the physical body contemplat-
ed by the Amendment. It cannot vote, it cannot physically be imprisoned, and it 
cannot physically exercise religion through worship or reflection. A corporation 
may only be punished by infringements on its rights to exist, to contract, or to 
do business within a jurisdiction.281 Corporate consequences are not imposi-
tions on a physical body. When a person is held liable for corporate actions, it 
is based on their individual role in the activity, not those taken by the corpora-
tion itself. For this reason, rights should be limited to what the state grants and 
what a corporation can do independent of its human agents.  
Rights that are purely personal or purely corporeal should not be extended 
to the corporation through the aggregate theory. There is no need to recognize 
the constitutional rights of shareholders or officers through the corporation. In-
stead, the Court should recognize the financial and fiduciary rights embodied 
by corporate and contract law. In other words, a corporation has no human 
rights—no religion, no race, no gender, no sexuality, no disability, no body to 
wrongfully imprison, and no right to exist at all if the state revises the agree-
ment or the corporation fails to comply with the terms of its agreement with the 
state. Because the corporation lacks the physical body, it does not need the 
same protections as the people who make up the corporation. 
The corporation is a real entity, and, like a natural person, it is not born 
with all rights. The corporation differs from the natural person in that it may 
never become a full citizen of an appropriate age to avail itself of all Constitu-
tional rights. The corporation is limited by what the state intended to create, 
and the realities of how the corporation operates. Instead of viewing the corpo-
ration as a person with rights incidental to the rights of individuals, the Court 
should return to the original artificial-entity view which maintains states’ rights 
to form and exercise control of the corporation, while also acknowledging any 
rights that naturally flow from its existence as a real recognized legal entity. 
States may define through statutes which rights it intends only for human be-
ings, and which are intended for all persons, both natural and artificial.282 
                                                        
280  See Chatman supra note 2, at 70. 
281  Id.; see also Pollman, Constitutionalizing, supra note 5, at 642, 647–48. 
282  Some states have already made efforts to amend their RFRA’s to ensure that the holding 
in Hobby Lobby will apply. See, e.g., S.B. 975, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015); 
S. Enrolled Act 50, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015); S. Enrolled Act 101, 
119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015). 
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C. Ruby, Inc.: A Hindu Hospitality Company 
When the founders of Ruby, Inc. transition from a partnership, they create 
a new legal person with rights and responsibilities divorced from the rights and 
responsibilities of the shareholders, directors, officers, and employees of Ruby, 
Inc. The people involved in Ruby, Inc. are either acting on behalf of the corpo-
ration, acting in the best interest of the corporation, providing the capital neces-
sary for Ruby, Inc. to exist, or taking their share of any returns on their invest-
ment. The human beings involved with Ruby, Inc. do not define the corporation 
or own the corporation.283 They are instead a part of the system that allows this 
new entity to exist and survive.284 Thus, to determine the rights of Ruby, Inc., 
the corporate person, Ruby, Inc., must be legally defined in a way that is dis-
tinct from its people. 
Corporate law does not allow Ruby, Inc. to be an aggregate entity that is a 
representative of the people who make up the corporation. Unlike Ruby Part-
ners, which was owned and controlled by the partners, Ruby, Inc. is distinct 
and new, with shareholders owning equity in the corporation and directors and 
officers managing the day-to-day operations. The managers are required to op-
erate in a way that protects the best interests of the corporation.285 The directors 
and officers are advancing the beliefs and missions of the corporation, but not 
the individual beliefs of the shareholders.286 This new state-created creature 
must operate within the parameters placed upon its existence by the state, but is 
otherwise a separate and fully recognized entity.287 
Citizens United disregards this basic tenet of corporate law, and would al-
low the founders of Ruby, Inc. to have it both ways just because the rights that 
the Court believes flow through the corporation to its people are in question. 
Under the aggregate theory, the Court would look through Ruby, Inc. to the 
shareholders of Ruby to determine whether the dietary restrictions are a part of 
those people’s rights of free exercise. Application of the aggregate theory seeks 
to ensure that the rights of human beings are protected in every scenario, even 
when those individuals are not a legally recognized part of the organization’s 
reality. Because the founders, shareholders, directors, and officers of Ruby, Inc. 
                                                        
283  See Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 63, at 591 (Noting that because a corporation is an 
artificial person, it cannot be owned just like a human being cannot be owned. What share-
holders own are shares in the corporation, not the corporation itself). 
284  Id. 
285  In fact, corporate statutes focus on the independence of directors and provide a means for 
protecting them from proper business decisions that contradict the intentions of shareholders. 
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101–398, 141(a) (2017); see also Belinfanti & Stout, supra, 
note 63, at 622 (explaining that most of the deference to shareholders in Supreme Court de-
cisions is mere dicta, and the Court instead defers to management judgment under the para-
digm of the business judgment rule); see also, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 
906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (directors must 
protect interests of corporations and serve as trustees of stockholders). 
286  See supra Section III.A. 
287  See supra Section IV.B. 
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are practicing and promoting Hinduism, the Court would protect this alleged 
exercise at Ruby, Inc. This outcome would be acceptable if Ruby were still a 
partnership, but given the difference between a partnership and a corporation, a 
different approach is necessary to properly define the rights of Ruby, Inc. 
For a partnership, application of the artificial entity theory and the aggre-
gate theory is reasonable. The partnership is, quite literally, an association of 
citizens, or, at the least, persons. So, it would be acceptable for a court to look 
through Ruby Partners to the people who make the Ruby partnership. For a 
corporation, designed to stand alone after formation, combining the artificial 
entity theory with the aggregate theory is far less reasonable. Instead, courts 
should acknowledge the power of the state through the artificial entity theory 
and the separate nature of the corporation through the real entity theory. 
The opening hypothetical serves to illustrate the differences between the 
hybrid theory and the aggregate theory.288 Under the hybrid theory, step one re-
quires the court to apply the artificial entity theory to first consider how the 
corporation was defined by statutes to determine what was granted or implied 
by the state at the time Ruby, Inc. was incorporated. Then, the court would ap-
ply the real entity theory and look to Ruby, Inc., as a stand-alone real entity, to 
determine whether state action infringes on a right that exists for the corpora-
tion itself. Under the hybrid theory the thoughts, emotions, and beliefs held by 
the Ruby, Inc. directors and officers would not influence a determination of the 
religious exercise of Ruby, Inc. Application of the hybrid theory makes bestow-
ing corporations with rights that only human beings can physically enjoy more 
difficult because it requires the corporation to engage in activities representa-
tive of their rights.289 The hybrid theory gives the Court less wiggle room, 
which results in corporate constitutional law decisions with more weight and 
clarity.290 
To analyze corporate rights under the hybrid theory requires two steps: 
first, determine what is granted by the state at the time of incorporation, then 
analyze what rights are incidental to the corporation’s existence. The hypothet-
                                                        
288  In partnerships, even partnerships with limited liability protections, at least one partner is 
actively involved in the management of the company. A Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) 
is a general partnership that has filed a statement of qualification. In all states except for 
South Carolina and Louisiana, it provides a liability shield to partners, protecting them from 
personal liability for partnership obligations. It is governed by the same statutes as partner-
ships and taxed the same as a partnership but requires a formal filing to make the partnership 
more than a general partnership. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 306(c). 
289  See discussion supra Part IV (Outlining the differences between human beings and artifi-
cial persons, and fully explaining step one analysis). 
290  See Gordon, supra note 34; Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory, supra note 92 
at 859. Professor Chemerinsky notes that it would be difficult to avoid applying the Citizens 
United holding to other contexts related to speech and non-citizens. CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 2. There is similar room to apply the decision in other corporate law contexts. See also 
Chatman, supra note 2, at 72. 
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ical notes that at incorporation, Ruby, Inc. is formed for only legal purposes.291 
The incorporators did not choose to spell out the advancement and promotion 
of Hinduism or vegetarianism in the corporate charter. Thus, under the artificial 
entity theory, the Hindu religion is not a protection granted by the state at the 
time of incorporation. Further, the need to practice and promote a religion is 
not incidental to what is granted by the State of Delaware when Ruby, Inc. is 
incorporated. Under the artificial entity theory, the founders of Ruby, Inc. will 
not be able to use the exercise of religion to justify its vegetarian policies.  
Depending on what is documented and promoted by Ruby, Inc. in its char-
ter, bylaws, board resolutions, corporate policies, mission statements, manuals, 
official board minutes, and other items that make up and represent Ruby, Inc., 
the corporation may be able to avail itself of religious protection through the 
real entity theory. The hybrid theory also requires analysis of corporate actions 
on the premise that Ruby, Inc. is a stand-alone entity embodied with its own 
distinct and separate rights. Under the real entity theory, the court would look 
to Ruby, Inc. itself to determine whether it is promoting and advancing Hindu-
ism and vegetarianism. Ruby, Inc. has well-known vegetarian restaurants, ex-
plains its policy in communications with its guests, and requires compliance on 
the premises. Assuming this belief is also represented in corporate meeting 
minutes and other representations of corporate intent produced by the agents of 
the corporation, Ruby, Inc. may be able to avail itself of religious protection. In 
step two, if the Court determines that the activity of the corporation itself is 
worthy of constitutional protection, it would then look to see if a state action 
has improperly infringed upon that right. 
This hypothetical illustrates that at times the hybrid theory may result in 
the same outcome as the aggregate theory. If Ruby is found to have a right 
based on the first step of the hybrid analysis, it may avail itself of rights associ-
ated with the exercise of religion. Similarly, if instead rights were granted to 
Hobby Lobby based on how Hobby Lobby is formed and how it operates, as 
opposed to the religious beliefs of the people who make up Hobby Lobby, it 
would be an appropriate outcome under the hybrid theory. What is significant 
about the hybrid theory is not the outcome, it is that it properly apportions 
rights to the corporation itself while giving adequate deference to state power. 
Instead of looking through the corporation to the people who make up the cor-
poration, the hybrid theory looks at what is granted by the state (artificial entity 
theory) or what actions are taken by the corporation (real entity theory). The 
                                                        
291  Corporate statutes under both the MBCA and the DGCL allow for corporations to be 
formed for general purposes. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8 § 102(a)(3) (2017); MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT § 3.02 (2016). Historically, corporations were required to be more specific when 
defining the corporate purpose. The general purposes designation is an affirmative choice by 
founders, used to avoid the risk of falling prey to the ultra vires doctrine. Thus, if a corpora-
tion desired to be bound and limited by the religious convictions or other parameters of the 
corporate founder’s choosing, there is a body of law that supports and enforces those choic-
es. See ERIC A. CHIAPPINELLI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ENTITIES 385–87 (3d ed. 
2014) (discussing the decline of the ultra vires doctrine and rise of general purpose statutes). 
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hybrid theory also starts at step one instead of step two and working back-
wards—instead of looking at whether the right is one the corporation deserves 
to have first, then working backwards to find a justification, the court would 
instead look at what the corporation is and what it does to determine rights. Uti-
lizing the hybrid theory ensures a proper analysis of the rights of corporations 
as they relate to natural persons and the states. 
The two-step analysis is fact intensive because corporations are man-made 
entities and personhood is a legal fiction. The facts and evidence necessary to 
confirm how the corporation is defined at the time of formation is defined by 
states. In step two, the trier of fact can determine how much weight should be 
given to representations of the corporations. Because corporations are fictional 
people, a court may question aspects of a corporation’s life that would be con-
stitutionally forbidden for natural persons. The hybrid theory requires courts to 
do the two-step analysis to determine corporate rights because to give purely 
human rights to non-humans should require adequate evidence of human be-
havior. 
Application of the hybrid theory also highlights the power of the state to 
correct results that are outside of what it intended for its creation. In Trustees of 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, Chief Justice John Marshall limited the 
state’s ability to deviate from what it agreed to at the time the corporation was 
founded, acting against Dartmouth individually and invalidating the operation 
of its corporate charter.292 The state could, however, redefine the corporation in 
its enabling statutes.293 In many ways, Dartmouth took a hybrid approach. The 
state was bound by what it agreed to in its contract with the corporation and its 
founders, but because the corporation was a creature of the state, it could rede-
fine the very nature of the corporation.294 When the Dartmouth corporation en-
gaged in allowable activities within the scope of what the state granted, those 
activities had legal protection derived from the corporation itself. What was 
true about the corporation in 1819 is true for the nature of the relationship be-
tween states and corporations today. States may define through statutes which 
rights it intends only for human beings, and which it intends for all persons, 
both natural and artificial.295 Courts must analyze the facts surrounding the cor-
poration’s existence through the two-step analysis to give proper deference to 
state and corporate founder intentions. 
                                                        
292  See supra text accompanying notes 41–45 for full discussion of Dartmouth. 
293  Id. 
294  In Dartmouth, Chief Justice Marshall notes that altering the statute defining corporations 
is an option for the state of New Hampshire. Since all states require corporations to regularly 
update the state and file reports to remain in existence, it is possible for states to impose 
some requirements retroactively. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 502, 510–511 (2017). 
295  Some states have already made efforts to amend their RFRA’s to ensure that the holding 
in Hobby Lobby will apply. See, e.g., supra note 282. 
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CONCLUSION 
A simple analysis of how corporations are formed and how they operate 
explains the flaws in the Court’s corporate-rights analysis over the years. These 
erroneous decisions happen because the Court has, in part, disregarded business 
principles and corporate law when issuing corporate-constitutional decisions. 
Instead of focusing on state power and corporate structure, the Court focuses on 
constitutional theory, taking a right-by-right, and in some circumstances, a 
case-by-case approach, that is divorced from the facts surrounding the individ-
ual corporation’s existence because it focuses on the human rights of the people 
who make up the corporation.296 A desire to adequately protect interests and 
actions of human beings that should be protected in all circumstances combined 
with flawed assumptions and misunderstandings about the corporate form have 
resulted in decisions that start at step two of the analysis when determining 
corporate rights.297 By first deciding that the corporation has the right (or is not 
intended to have the right), then deciding what beliefs about the corporate form 
must be present to validate the decision, the Court has left a trail of opinions 
that vacillate among theories of corporate personhoods without ever developing 
a clear, constitutional definition of corporate personhood.298 The attention given 
to Citizens United has exposed a long-standing problem, and has provided an 
opportunity to look at the true nature of the corporation and its relationship to 
shareholders, management, states, and third parties.299 
Corporate personhood is itself a legal fiction, and the corporate personhood 
theories are useful for articulating the relationship of the corporation to society, 
but no single theory adequately addresses every scenario.300 The concession or 
artificial entity theory only defines the corporation’s legal recognition and ex-
istence. It distinguishes it from other entities that are also creatures of state law. 
Concession theory is used to define what the corporation is because to do so 
acknowledges the initial terms of the agreement. But we must do more than just 
analyze the facts of corporate formation in order to appreciate fully how corpo-
rations operate in the world. A modern view recognizes the corporation’s many 
facets.301 Corporate-personhood analysis cannot end at formation. 
Courts must acknowledge that corporations, like natural persons, are not 
one thing—the corporation is an artificial entity that exists at the pleasure of the 
state and stands alone with independent rights once it is formed. After the cor-
poration is formed through concessions of the state, the corporation has rights, 
inherent and earned, and those rights cannot be infringed upon by the state, and 
                                                        
296  Garrett, supra note 5, at 100. 
297  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 84, at 33; see also discussion in Section III.A. 
298  See discussion supra Section III.B. 
299  See discussion supra Part II (discussing the true nature of shareholder rights and the role 
of corporate management). 
300  See discussion supra Section III.B; see also Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 63, at 579. 
301  See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 72, at 42 (discussing the limits of the conces-
sion/artificial entity theory). 
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are wholly separate from the interests of its founders. Notably, these corporate 
rights are not “human rights”—there is no right to religion, right to liberty, or 
any other right by default. Under the hybrid theory, a corporation may have ac-
cess to certain “human rights” in two ways: (1) by including an intent to engage 
in activity requiring protection in a corporate charter, or (2) by a state indicat-
ing in statutes that it intends for the artificial-corporate person to have such pro-
tections.  
Corporations are persons, standing alone and independent, without the 
rights of the people who comprise them because the corporation was formed to 
be separate and managed by external forces.302 The people forming the corpora-
tion willfully exchanged control for the benefit of divorcing themselves from 
liability, gaining perpetual life, and the opportunity for easier external invest-
ments.303 This choice, represented by the contract the people entered into with 
the state when they made the affirmative choice of the corporate form, is gov-
erned by the corporate charter and limited by the benefits gained.304 The aggre-
gate theory wrongly allows individuals to divorce themselves from business for 
protections, and then allows them to superimpose their rights on the corpora-
tion, reuniting with the business when desired. For this reason, the rights of the 
corporation should be defined by the state, and be based on considerations es-
sential or incidental to the corporate form—not based on the rights of the cor-
poration’s people.305 To expand rights beyond those clearly essential and inci-

















                                                        
302  See supra Section II.A. 
303  See supra Section II.A. 
304  See supra Section III.B. 
305  See supra Part II. 
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